The Evolution Of Non-Kin Cooperation In Joint-Nesting Taiwan Yuhinas, Yuhina Brunneiceps by Shen, Sheng-Feng
  
THE EVOLUTION OF NON-KIN COOPERATION IN JOINT-NESTING 
TAIWAN YUHINAS, YUHINA BRUNNEICEPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Sheng-Feng Shen 
January 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2009 Sheng-Feng Shen 
THE EVOLUTION OF NON-KIN COOPERATION IN JOINT-NESTING 
TAIWAN YUHINAS, YUHINA BRUNNEICEPS 
 
Sheng-Feng Shen, Ph. D. 
Cornell University 2009 
 
Cooperation among individuals occurs throughout nature. However, how diverse 
forms of social organizations are shaped by natural selection in different ecological 
and social conditions remains a puzzle. In this thesis, I use evolutionary game theory 
and inclusive fitness theory to model social conflict and its resolutions. I use Taiwan 
yuhinas, a passerine bird species in which multiple, non-related females lay eggs 
jointly in the same nest and then all group members cooperate in rearing the young, as 
a model system to study the formation and stability of non-kin groups. Based on the 
theory of reproductive skew, I derive the necessary prerequisite condition for the 
evolution of any stable social group: The reproductive productivity of the group must 
exceed that of the sum of all of its members if they attempted to reproduce solitarily. I 
argue that different types of group benefits have different influences on the properties 
and composition of cooperative breeding groups. I develop the “boarded tug-of-war 
model”, which synthesizes previous transactional and tug-of-war models of 
reproductive skew, to obtain the general ecological and social conditions for a stable 
social group to evolve. This synthesis model predicts that different conflict resolution 
mechanisms will be selected in different ecological and social conditions. I also model 
the general effect of parental investment on reproductive skew by relaxing the 
restrictive assumptions of existing models. My expanded model clarifies how 
adjustable parental effort can influence the resulting reproductive skew and social 
conflict. Finally, I use Taiwan yuhinas as an empirical case study of the evolution of  
non-kin groups. I find that kin are more likely than non-kin to join groups, but only 
when group sizes are larger than the most productive sizes. I interpret this as 
suggesting that yuhinas still prefer to cooperate with kin. The reason yuhinas typically 
form non-kin groups is that maturing young have excellent opportunities for 
successful dispersal and reproduction elsewhere. This results in a high offspring 
dispersal rate, which limits the chance of adults recruiting their young (kin) into 
cooperative breeding groups. Studying the evolution of non-kin cooperation can help 
us understand the general principle of stable cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GROUP BENEFITS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATIVE BREEDING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The selective forces favoring cooperative breeding, where more than two adults 
provide care in the rearing of young, are generally considered different from those 
favoring other types of group living (Dickinson & Hatchwell 2004; Emlen & 
Vehrencamp 1983). This is because, unlike many social groups, the per capita 
reproductive success in cooperatively breeding societies shows no consistent pattern 
with group size, and in most cases per capita reproductive success of single pairs is 
highest (Koenig 1981). Therefore, the formation of cooperatively breeding groups, 
especially in birds, is usually explained by the ecological constraints hypothesis: 
mature offspring delay dispersal and stay at home because they are “forced” to do so 
by severe ecological constraints, e.g. lack of high quality territories and/or mates, that 
limit the option of mature offspring to disperse and breed solitarily (Brown 1974; 
Emlen 1982a; Gaston 1978; Koenig & Pitelka 1981; Selander 1964). The benefit of 
philopatry hypothesis provided an alternative explanation for the evolution of 
cooperative breeding. It proposed that mature offspring delay dispersal because they 
can gain a net fitness benefit by doing so (Stacey & Ligon 1987; Stacey & Ligon 
1991). There has been much debate on the distinctions between these two hypotheses, 
but now it is generally accepted that these two hypotheses are, in fact, two sides of the 
same coin and both are based on the cost-benefit analysis of leaving versus staying. 
The ecological constraints hypothesis was subsequently generalized to include both 
intrinsic benefits and extrinsic constraints and successfully accommodates the benefit 
of philopatry hypothesis (Emlen 1994; Hatchwell & Komdeur 2000; Koenig et al. 
1992).     2   
       The ecological constraints hypothesis has been supported by many excellent 
studies (Baglione et al. 2006; Dickinson & McGowan 2005; Komdeur 1992; Pruett-
Jones & Lewis 1990; Rubenstein & Lovette 2007). However, many authors have 
argued that an apparent weakness of this hypothesis is that numerous species also face 
strong ecological constraints but they are not cooperative breeders (Brockmann 1997; 
Covas & Griesser 2007; Hatchwell & Komdeur 2000; Koenig et al. 1992; Kokko 
2007; Smith 1990). Theoretical models have also shown the possibility that ecological 
constraints might not lead to delayed offspring dispersal and cooperative breeding 
(Pen & Weissing 2000). Moreover, there are many cooperatively breeding societies, 
including most insect societies and marine fishes, that are not formed through delayed 
offspring dispersal (Cockburn 1998; Costa 2006). For example, marine fish larvae are 
usually swept far from their natal territory by currents, and helpers in these 
cooperative fish societies are mostly comprised of non-kin individuals (e.g. Buston et 
al. 2007). Therefore, the ecological constraints hypothesis, with its foundation in 
delayed dispersal, is difficult to apply to these non-kin cooperatively breeding 
societies in the current framework. Consequently, delayed dispersal and ecological 
constraints, although important for many societies, might be neither necessary nor 
sufficient conditions for the evolution of cooperative breeding. It has also been pointed 
out that hypotheses based on delayed offspring dispersal could “potentially divert us 
from recognizing parallels between families and societies formed through coalitions of 
unrelated individuals”(Cockburn 1998). The overly general definition of ecological 
constraints also makes it difficult to obtain useful predictive power and can lead to 
facile post hoc identification of constraints (Hatchwell & Komdeur 2000; Kokko & 
Ekman 2002).  
      In this paper, we argue that distinguishing different types of group benefits is the 
key to develop a unified framework for understanding various cooperative breeding  3   
societies (see also Koenig 1981; Koenig et al. 1992; Rankin et al. 2007; Vehrencamp 
1983). We will first show that a group benefit is the necessary condition for the 
evolution of cooperative breeding by developing a simple Hamiltonian model. We will 
then distinguish two major types of group benefits, namely resource benefit and social 
benefit. Instead of focusing on delayed offspring dispersal, the social and resource 
benefits framework can be applied to various cooperatively breeding societies. The 
insider-outsider conflict model will then be introduced to overcome the problem of 
focusing on delayed offspring dispersal. Consequently, the “typical” cooperatively 
breeding groups, formed through delayed offspring dispersal, in most birds and 
mammals can be understood in the same general framework with “untypical” groups, 
not formed by delayed offspring dispersal, in most insects and fishes.  
 
NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL GROUP  
       Based on Hamilton’s rule, for an individual to prefer joining a social group over 
being solitary, the inclusive fitness of joining must be higher than being solitary. 
Using the above logic, we derive the necessary condition for forming a social group, 
which is simply  
12
1
( , ) .....
n
ni
i
Gnr L L L L
=
>++ += ∑        (1), 
where G(n,r) is the group productivity with n group members with average 
relatedness of r and Li is direct fitness for the i
th individual of being solitary (box 1). In 
other words, for a social group to form and be stable, the group productivity has to be 
higher than the sum of the solitary payoff of each group member, regardless of the 
relatedness between group members. However, relatedness does affect group 
productivity by affecting level of social conflict and/or individuals’ investment in 
creating group resources. Using inequality (1), it is clear that the original ecological  4   
constraint hypothesis represents a low solitary payoff (small Ln), but it is not sufficient 
for the evolution of cooperative breeding. This also explains the lack of predictive 
power of the ecological constraint hypothesis, as many authors have pointed out 
(Brockmann 1997; Covas & Griesser 2007; Hatchwell & Komdeur 2000; Koenig et al. 
1992; Kokko 2007; Smith 1990). Similarly, the benefit of philopatry hypothesis is a 
special case of the group benefit hypothesis, that emphasizes the benefit offspring can 
obtain by staying in the natal territory.  
 The general conclusion of combining the ecological constraint and benefit of 
philopatry hypotheses is equivalent to comparing the inclusive fitness between staying 
versus leaving, which is overly generous and basically the restatement of Hamilton’s 
rule. Interestingly, by applying Hamilton’s rule, inequality (1) shows that group 
benefit is the necessary condition for the evolution of all social groups, regardless of 
relatedness. Therefore, to develop a general framework for understanding various 
cooperatively breeding societies, we start with proposing that there are two key 
different types of group benefits, i.e. resource and social benefits, and then discuss 
how to separate different types of group benefits (see also Koenig 1981; Koenig et al. 
1992; Rankin et al. 2007; Vehrencamp 1983). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Box 1 
We employed Hamilton’s rule for deciding whether joining a group or breeding 
solitarily will be favored by the natural selection (Hamilton 1964, Grafen 1984). For 
simplicity, we first consider a two-player group. Let G be the group productivity, p1 be 
individual 1’s share, and p2 be individual 2’s share of group productivity. Thus, the 
direct fitnesses of joining a group is Gp1 for individual 1 and Gp2 for individual 2. 
Also, let the payoff of being solitary be L1 and L2 for individual 1 and 2, respectively. 
Joining a group will be favored over be solitary for individual 1 if  5   
    11 22 () (  ) 0 Gp L r Gp L −+ −≥ , (B1) 
where r is the coefficient of relatedness. 
By setting (B1)=0 and solve for p1, we can obtain the minimum share that individual 1 
needs to favor joining a group over being solitary, which is  
122
1
[]
*
Lr LG p
p
G
+−
= .  (B2a) 
Similarly, the minimum share for individual 2 to favor joining a group is 
 
21 1
2
[]
*
Lr LG p
p
G
+−
= . (B2b) 
The sum of individual minimum shares, p1* and p2*, has to be smaller than one, so 
that both individuals would prefer joining a group. This can be expressed as follows: 
12 1( * * ) 0 pp −+> . (B3) 
Substituting (B2a) and (B2b) into (B3), we get 
12 12 12 [( ) ]
10
LLr LLG pp
G
++ +− +
−> . (B4) 
Since individual 1 and 2 share all the group resources, we substitute 12 1 pp +=  into 
(B4) and obtain  
12 [( ) ] [ 1 ]
0
GLL r
G
−+ +
> . (B5)  
Therefore, for (B5)>0, the following inequality must be true 
12 GLL >+ (B6) 
Now, let G(n,r) represent the group productivity function, which is determined by 
group size, n, and r represent relatedness between group members. Using the same 
logic, we find that the minimum share, pi*, for i
th individual in a n- player group is  
11
[( ,) ]
*
(,)
nn
ij j i j
jj
i
Lr G n r p L
p
Gnr
≠
==
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=
∑∑
.  (B7) 
Similarly, the sum of all group members’ minimum shares has to be smaller than one, 
1
1* 0
n
i
i
p
=
−≥ ∑ . (B8)  6   
By substituting (B7) into (B8), we get 
12 [ ( , ) ( ... ][1 ( 1) ]
0
(,)
n Gnr L L L n r
Gnr
−+ + + + −
≥ .  (B9) 
Thus, based on (B9), we prove that 
12
1
( , ) .....
n
ni
i
Gnr L L L L
=
>++ += ∑   (B10) 
 
TYPES OF GROUP BENEFITS 
Resource benefit 
Resource is defined here as something from the environment that an animal needs, 
such as food, territories, and nesting sites (Johnson et al. 2002). Although shortage of 
mates is often considered as a type of ecological constraint, we do not include 
potential mates as a type of resource. Mates are not environmental features and the key 
issue with mate shortage is what causes the imbalance of sex ratio, which is beyond 
the scope of this review. The definition of the resource benefit is that group 
productivity is determined by the quality of resources and cannot be increased by 
cooperation between group members. If resource benefit is the key benefit of group 
living, total group productivity should decrease as group size increase (Fig. 1.1a) and 
the per capita productivity would also decrease as group size increase (Fig.1.1b) 
because of the “ill effect of overcrowding” (Allee 1938). Also, the total group 
productivity and per capita productivity with good quality resources should be higher 
than with poor quality resources. Formally, based on inequality (1), resource benefit is 
defined as 
1
(, ,) ( 1 , )
n
Gi
i
R nE r R E
=
>∑    (2). 
The left-hand side of the inequality (2) is the group productivity,  ( , , ) G R nE r  (R 
represents Resource), which is a function of group size, n, resource quality as the key 
Ecological factor, EG, and relatedness, r , between group members. Note that group  7   
productivity only decreases as group size, n, increases. The right-hand side of the 
inequality (2) is the sum of each individual’s direct fitness of being solitary (n=1), 
which is influenced by the quality of the resource the i
th individual can obtain, 
indicating by Ei. In other words, when sharing of good quality resources has a higher 
payoff than being solitary in a poor resource context, social groups could form 
because of mutual tolerance. Mutual tolerance is considered the first step toward 
sociality because individuals have to be together for more advanced types of group 
benefit to evolve (Allee 1938).  
      In the context of cooperative breeding, this type of group formation mechanism is 
usually referred to as extrinsic constraints or habitat saturation (Brown 1974; Emlen 
1982a; Koenig et al. 1992). By this explanation, offspring forgo solitary breeding and 
delay dispersal because high quality resources, usually territories, are not available. 
Therefore, delayed dispersal is considered to be a ‘best-of-a-bad-job’ strategy since 
solitary breeding pairs usually have the highest per capita productivity (Koenig 1981). 
However, the concept of resource benefit is more general than extrinsic constraints 
because it is not based on explaining delayed offspring dispersal. For example, in 
burying beetles, joint breeding on large carcasses between unrelated females might be 
caused by the high cost of excluding co-breeders (Eggert & Muller 1997). In other 
words, group members breed jointly, not because co-breeders can bring any benefit, 
but simply because they are unable to exclude other individuals from sharing high 
quality resources, i.e. large carcasses, and thus ‘tolerate’ each other. Similarly, the 
high quality natal territory has been experimentally proven to be the key resource 
benefit for offspring to stay and become helpers in western bluebirds (Dickinson & 
McGowan 2005) and carrion crows (Baglione et al. 2006).  
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(a) 
   
 (b)  
 
  
 
Figure 1.1 (a) Effects group size and resource quality on group productivity, 
(, ,) G R nE r, in a resource benefit type of social group. Group productivity of this type 
is determined by the resource quality and only decreases as group size increases 
because ill effect of crowding, such as competition between group members. (b) 
Effects group size and resource quality  
on per capita group productivity, 
(, ,) G R nE r
n
, in a resource benefit type of social 
group.  
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 Social benefit 
    Social benefit is defined as any group benefit generated by social coordination, such 
as reproductive, protective, and foraging benefits (Krause & Ruxton 2002; 
Whitehouse & Lubin 2005). By this definition, we exclude passive grouping effects 
such as lower predation rates in larger colonies. If a social benefit is more important 
for group formation, group productivity and per capita productivity usually increase as 
group size increases until they reach an optimum point and then decrease as group size 
increases (Fig. 1.1c,1.1d). The social benefit is defined mathematically as follows: 
1
(, ,) ( 1 , )
n
Gi
i
SnE r S E
=
>∑     (3) 
Again, the left-hand side of the inequality (3) is the group productivity,  ( , , ) G SnE r 
(S represents Social), which is a function of group size, n, Ecological factors, EG, and 
relatedness, r , between group members. The right-hand side of the inequality (3) is 
the sum of each individual’s direct fitness from breeding solitarily (n=1), which is 
influenced by the resource quality i
th individual can obtain, indicated by Ei. 
The magnitude of group benefit is generally affected by ecological factors, such 
as food abundance and predation risk. For example, in the colonial-breeding sociable 
weaver, experimental supplementation of food decreases the average group size and 
increases the percentage of breeders in the manipulated colonies (Covas et al. 2004). 
This experiment clearly shows that food supplementation decreases the cost of 
foraging and thus decreases the social benefits created by group cooperation. In other 
words, the social benefit derived from group provisioning of young is more important 
when ecological conditions are poor (Fig. 1.1c and 1.1d).   
      Again, intrinsic benefits in the cooperative breeding literature belong to this social 
benefit category. Social benefit is more general than the intrinsic benefits or benefit of 
philopatry hypothesis because it is not based on explaining delayed offspring  10   
dispersal. For example, some ant foundress associations consist of unrelated queens, 
which are clearly not formed through delayed offspring dispersal (Bernasconi & 
Strassmann 1999). The main reason that these non-kin groups form is because 
multiple-queen colonies can produce more workers to defend the nest and therefore 
can survive brood-raiding attacks better. Similarly, the social benefit of improved 
between-group competitive ability for resources is viewed as an important selective 
force for the formation of non-kin human social groups as well as kin social insect 
groups (Reeve & Hölldobler 2007; West et al. 2006). 
 
(c) 
   
 (d) 
   
 
Figure 1.1 (c) Effects group size and resource quality on group productivity, 
(, ,) G SnE r, in a social benefit type of social group. The group productivity is 
increased through cooperation between group members. Thus, it increases as group 
size increases until it reach a point and then decreases as group size increases because 
the ill effect of crowding out weight the benefit created by group cooperation. (d) 
Effects group size and resource  
quality on per capita group productivity,  
(, ,) G SnE r
n
, in a social benefit type of social 
group.  11   
INTERGRATING SOCIAL AND RESOURCE BENEFITS WITH ECOLOGICAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
    We have emphasized the importance of separating social and resource benefits. 
However, social and resource benefits can both influence the evolution of cooperative 
breeding in a species. A more complete expression of the group benefit is 
(, ,) (, ,)  (, ,) GG G G n Er S n Er R n Er α = +   (4), 
where the influence of social benefit to group productivity is standardized to 1 and the 
influence of resource benefit is represented by α. When individuals are solitary, their 
direct fitnesses are not affected by group size and relatedness, but determined by the 
quality of the resources. This means that  
S(1,Ei)=R(1,Ei)=L(Ei),    (5) 
As a result, substituting inequality (4) and (5) into inequality (1), we obtain the 
explicitly necessary condition for a group to form and be stable, as follows 
1
(, ,) (, ,) ( )
n
GG i
i
S n Er R n Er L E α
=
+> ∑    (6) 
We believe that the important issue is to determine the relative importance of 
resource versus social benefits and their effect on the stability and size of the group. 
The best way to test the relative importance of social and resource benefits is through 
manipulation experiments. For example, in an excellent study of banded killifish, food 
and predation risk were manipulated separately. Predator scent was used to increase 
the benefit of group foraging and food scent modulated the perceived amount of 
resource. Killifish formed larger groups when predator scent was presented and were 
solitary or formed smaller groups when food scent was added. However, the group 
size is intermediate when both food and predator scent are presented (Hoare et al. 
2004). Several other excellent experiments in cooperatively breeding species have 
shown the importance of social or resource benefits (Baglione et al. 2006; Dickinson  12   
& McGowan 2005; Heg et al. 2004; Pruett-Jones & Lewis 1990). It would be even 
better to manipulate both social and resource benefits in the same species to determine 
the relative importance of each, although it might be empirically challenging to so.  
 
TYPES OF GROUP BENEFIT AND THE GROUP COMPOSITION 
     The development of cooperative breeding theory has been largely influenced by 
avian studies and the helper-at-the-nest type of cooperative breeding system, in which 
“helpers” perform seemingly altruistic behavior such as foregoing personal 
reproduction and helping their parents. As a consequence, studies of cooperative 
breeding mainly focus on why offspring delay dispersal and why offspring help (but 
see Brown & Brown 1984; Cockburn 1996; Ekman et al. 2000; Emlen 1982b; 
Vehrencamp 1983). However, to develop a general theory of cooperative breeding, it 
is important to understand the costs and benefits of living in groups from the 
perspective of all group members.  
     The elegant concept of insider-outsider conflict constitutes the basic framework for 
studying group membership and group size in group-living species (Gaston 1978; 
Giraldeau & Caraco 1993; Higashi & Yamamura 1993). Insider-outsider conflict 
describes the tension between potential joiners, the outsiders, and the current group 
members, the insiders. For the insiders, it is often in their common interest to maintain 
the most productive group size. However, as long as joining the group yields higher 
inclusive fitness than being solitary, the outsiders would prefer to join the group and 
thus could drive the group size much larger than its most productive group size. If 
insiders have control of group membership, the observed group size is expected to be 
closer to the optimal size (Giraldeau & Caraco 2000). Following the logic of the 
insider-outsider conflict model, the parallel question to why offspring stay and help is  13   
why insiders, the parents, accept or even facilitate, rather than evict, the delayed 
dispersal offspring.  
   If resource benefit is the key factor favoring group formation and the insiders 
have control over group membership, only kin groups are expected to form and the 
more closely related the group members are, the larger the group size (Fig. 1.2a). Non-
kin groups can only form when insiders cannot control group membership. Also, 
groups with high quality resources are expected to have larger groups.  However, if 
the social benefit is critical for living in a group, both relatives and non-relatives will 
be accepted by group members if the group size is smaller than the most productive 
size. Similarly, only kin groups are expected when the group size is larger than the 
most productive size (Fig. 1.2b). Consequently, studies of cooperative breeding can be 
integrated into a more general framework of social evolution. 
 
(a)  
 
 (b)  
 
Figure 1.2  Group control version of insider-outsider conflict model. (a) Effect of 
relatedness on group size in (a) resource benefit type of group, and (b)social 
benefit type of group. Dash line indicates the payoff of solitary breeding.  
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BENEFITS, CONSTRAINTS, DELAYED DISPERSAL AND COOPERATIVE 
BREEDING 
As we will show in the following sections, we believe that many of the problems 
related to the ecological constraint theory can be clarified by applying the resource and 
social benefit concepts. 
 
1. The ecological constraint hypothesis lacks predictive power because most species 
face some sort of ecological constraint but do not delay dispersal. (Brockmann 1997; 
Covas & Griesser 2007; Hatchwell & Komdeur 2000; Koenig et al. 1992; Kokko 
2007; Smith 1990).  
      This problem can be addressed by separating ecological constraints into resource 
and social benefits. It is apparent that this statement only works if the ecological 
constraint is a resource benefit because, by definition, if it is a social benefit, there will 
be strong selective forces favoring social living. Therefore, the question can be 
restated as, if resources are limited in many species, e.g. habitat saturation, why don't 
they all delay dispersal? Based on our previous analysis (Fig. 1.1, inequality (2)), 
limited resources in the environment does not automatically lead to a resource benefit 
and this is why the ecological constraint is considered to lack predictive ability 
because the resource benefit is key selection factor favoring group living. The insider-
outsider conflict model also demonstrates that both the variation in resource quality 
and kinship are important for insiders to accept a potential joiner if the resource 
benefit is the key for a group to form. On the other hand, it has been shown both 
theoretically and empirically that given sufficient social benefits, groups can be stable 
even in the complete absence of constraints (Bull & Schwarz 1996; Kokko et al. 2001; 
Perrin & Lehmann 2001). Therefore, strong ecological constraints would not 
necessarily lead to cooperative breeding if the resource benefit is lacking, and  15   
cooperative breeding could be stable under weak ecological constraints if the social 
benefit is high. Together, this shows that the ecological constraint hypothesis alone is 
overly generous and lacks predictive power, and that the social and resource benefit 
concept can help resolve this problem.  
 
2. Stability of a social group  
     Based on the ecological constraints concept, cooperatively breeding groups are 
considered to be “inherently unstable” (Emlen 1995; Emlen 1997). This view has been 
supported by several excellent empirical studies (Dickinson & McGowan 2005; 
Komdeur 1992; Pruett-Jones & Lewis 1990; Walters et al. 1992). However, this view 
is clearly based on the resource benefits type of cooperative breeding groups. 
Similarly, delayed dispersal is often described as a “best-of-a-bad-job” strategy 
because of the fact that solitary breeders generally have the highest reproductive 
success, but this is only true for the resource benefit type of groups, as mentioned 
before. As a result, when high-quality resource becomes available, these delayed 
dispersal offspring would disperse and social groups are unstable.   
      Nevertheless, cooperatively breeding groups can be stable for many generations if 
social benefits are important for the formation of family groups. For example, in 
hunter-gather human societies, large extended families may be very stable for 
generations because large groups can defend themselves better and hunt more 
efficiently, without any limitation of resources (Alexander 1990). In pre-industrial 
human societies, the greater productivity of intensive cultivation results from more 
sophisticated technology, such as irrigation, and from intensification of labor, so 
family members are important working forces (Nanda 1991). These ideas all suggest 
that social benefits can lead to stable families and are supported by empirical data (e.g. 
Davis & Daly 1997).   16   
3. Bridging the gap between theories based on delayed dispersal and non-delayed 
dispersal. As mentioned above, the development of cooperative breeding theories has 
been strongly influenced by avian studies. Since most cooperative breeding avian 
societies form through delayed offspring dispersal, the evolution of delayed dispersal 
has been the central focus for theories of the evolution of cooperative breeding (see 
Emlen & Vehrencamp 1983 for a notable exception).  However, many cooperatively 
breeding groups are formed without delayed dispersal. Most researchers tend to treat 
these two types of breeding systems as having distinct selective forces. However, the 
distinction between the two might sometimes be difficult and artificial (Cockburn 
1998). We believe that distinguishing social and resource benefit mechanisms of 
group formation helps bridge the gap between theories based on delayed dispersal and 
non-delayed dispersal types of cooperative breeding. This is also why we do not use 
the original terms of intrinsic benefit and extrinsic constraints, proposed in the context 
of explaining delayed dispersal, because social and resource benefit concepts work 
both with and without delayed dispersal. As a consequence, this theoretical framework 
will also help to integrate studies on different taxa and different types of cooperative 
breeding societies.                                                        
 
4. Constraints, benefits, and delayed dispersal.  
    Most studies on cooperative breeding have focused their attention on delayed 
dispersal by addressing two stepwise questions: “(1) why do offspring remain with 
their parents rather than disperse and attempt to breed independently on their own? 
And (2) why do such grown offspring help, rather than ignore, the breeding efforts of 
other adults in their group?” (Emlen 1997). If we apply the resource and social benefit 
framework, it is clear that if offspring only stay in the natal territory because of the 
resource benefit, the separation between “why stay” and “why help” is meaningful.  17   
This is because if the main reason for staying is to gain a social benefit, e.g. increasing 
provisioning ability in poor years, delayed dispersal in such a scenario is linked with 
helping. This can help further clarify and shed new light on the old controversy 
between the ecological constraints hypothesis and the benefit of philopatry hypothesis. 
This disagreement has been settled by general consensus that the two hypotheses just 
look at different sides of the same coin: the benefit of staying and the cost of dispersal  
(but see Ligon 1999). However, we believe that there are deeper problems caused by 
the logical inconsistencies of both hypotheses. Stacey and Ligon (1991) listed the 
different predictions for the benefit of philopatry and ecological constraints 
hypotheses. Their benefit of philopatry hypothesis predictions are, in fact, based on 
social benefits and their ecological constraint hypothesis predictions are based on 
resource benefits. However, they include “access to critical resources”, which is a 
resource benefit, in the benefit of philopatry hypothesis, which is apparently 
equivalent to the ecological constraints hypothesis in stable environments (Stacey & 
Ligon 1987; Stacey & Ligon 1991). On the other hand, the original ecological 
constraints hypothesis emphasizes resource benefits when the environment is stable 
and social benefits when the environment is unpredictable (Emlen 1982a) . Therefore, 
the benefit of philopatry hypothesis provides the first hypothesis that social benefits 
alone, i.e. without habitat saturation or resource benefits, can favor the formation of 
stable social groups in stable environments. Unfortunately, the role of social benefits 
has been overlooked under the big umbrella of ecological constraints.  
 
5.  Inter-specific comparative studies on cooperative breeding  
We believe that the resource and social benefit concept might also help explain 
why inter-specific comparative studies in birds have difficulty finding a clear 
relationship between the incidence of cooperative breeding and any environmental  18   
factors (Brown 1987; Colwell 1974; Dow 1980; Duplessis et al. 1995; Ekman & 
Ericson 2006). It might simply be because those cooperative-breeding behaviors 
evolve through two distinctive routes, social versus resource benefits. For example, 
the life history hypothesis states that low annual mortality is the key factor that 
predisposes avian lineages to breed cooperatively, rather than any particular feature of 
their breeding ecology (Arnold 1998; Russell 1989). Extensions of the life history 
hypothesis further explain the link between life history traits, habitat saturation, and 
delayed dispersal in a stable environment, which are resource-benefit types of 
mechanisms (Covas & Griesser 2007; Hatchwell & Komdeur 2000; Kokko & Ekman 
2002). On the other hand, a recent nice comparative study on Africa starlings shows 
that temporal environmental variability is correlated with cooperative breeding 
(Rubenstein & Lovette 2007). In this case, coping with the fluctuating insect 
abundances caused by unpredictable rain fall in different years might be the most 
important social benefit of grouping (Emlen 1982a). Therefore, distinguishing 
cooperative breeding species that have evolved via resource versus social benefits in 
comparative studies could give a better resolution for finding the relationship between 
ecological factors, life history characteristics and cooperative breeding in various taxa.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REPRODUCTIVE SKEW THEORY UNIFIED:  
THE GENERAL BORDERED TUG-OF-WAR MODEL 
ABSTRACT 
Reproductive skew has been identified as a major dimension along which animal 
societies vary. Two major kinds of reproductive skew models are transactional 
models, in which explain the distribution of reproduction within animal societies as 
the result of reproductive payments exchanged among group members with 
differential leverage, and tug-of-war models, in which the reproductive shares are 
determined by costly 'tugs-of-war'. These two models have recently been synthesized 
to yield the mutual-pay, bordered tug-of-war model. In this paper, we extend the latter 
and demonstrate that the generalized model yields four sub-models, namely the 
mutual-pay, alpha-pay, beta-pay, and pure tug-of-war. The alpha-pay sub-model turns 
out to closely resemble the original “concessions” transactional skew model, and the 
beta-pay sub-model turns out to have properties similar to the “restraint” transactional 
skew model. Thus, the general model unifies the four major models of reproductive 
skew and is rich in its predictions, as each sub-model exhibits different qualitative and 
quantitative relationships between reproductive skew or intra-group conflict and the 
ecological and genetic factors that determine skew and conflict. The conditions 
favoring transitions among these sub-models also are precisely predicted by the 
general model.  The general model accommodates the data from acorn woodpeckers 
and primitively eusocial bees and potentially can account for many of the highly 
varied empirical findings on reproductive skew.  We suggest further research that 
focuses on (1) determining which model is suitable for certain species and (2) 
understanding why and how various social animals resolve their breeding conflict by 
different conflict resolution mechanisms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Reproductive skew refers to the partitioning of reproduction among same sex 
individuals within social groups and has been identified as a major dimension along 
which animal societies vary (Sherman et al., 1995). In high-skew societies, 
reproduction is monopolized by one or a few group members; in low-skew societies, 
reproduction is shared more evenly. Two major kinds of reproductive skew models are 
the transactional models and the tug-of-war models. Transactional models of social 
evolution explain the distribution of reproduction within animal societies as the result 
of reproductive payments exchanged among group members one of whom has 
complete control over reproductive shares (Buston et al., 2007; Emlen, 1982; 
Johnstone, 2000; Reeve and Keller, 2001; Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993; Vehrencamp, 
1983). In contrast, tug-of-war models assume that no individual may have complete 
control of the reproductive partitioning, and the reproductive skew may be determined 
instead by costly 'tugs-of-war' in which it is assumed that effort allocated to increasing 
one’s own selfish share results in decreased overall group productivity (Reeve et al., 
1998).  
 The fact that the applicability of the transactional models is limited by the 
assumption that someone has complete reproductive control and that tug-of-war 
models do not take group stability into account stimulated Reeve and Shen (2006) to 
develop the “mutual–pay bordered tug-of-war” model (or, the incomplete-control 
transactional model), which has elements of both the transactional model and the tug-
of-war model. In particular, the dominant and subordinate may yield some 
reproduction to each other to maintain group stability (i.e., there are mutual 
payments), as in a transactional model, but the dominant and subordinate might enter 
into a tug-of-war over the non-ceded part of reproduction. This model is more 
biologically realistic with predictions different from either the transactional or tug-of- 
 28   
war models (Reeve and Shen, 2006). Nonacs (2006; 2007) criticized this model on the 
grounds that the mutual payment bordered-tug-of-war will collapse to a pure tug-of-
war, but below we show why this conclusion is mistaken. Instead, we show that a 
natural generalization of the mutual-payment, bordered tug-of-war immediately 
generates four special case skew models: (1) the mutual-pay bordered tug-of-war, (2) 
the original pure tug-of-war, (3) a bordered tug-of-war in which the subordinate pays 
the dominant but not vice versa (a “beta-pay” bordered tug-of-war), and (4) a bordered 
tug-of-war in which the dominant pays the subordinate but not vice versa (an “alpha-
pay” bordered tug-of-war). The alpha-pay sub-model turns out to closely resemble the 
original “concessions” model of transactional skew theory, and the beta-pay sub-
model turns out to have properties similar to the “restraint” model of transactional 
skew theory. In short, the general model unifies the four major models of reproductive 
skew. Moreover, by relaxing the restrictive “complete control” assumption of the 
original transactional theory, we argue that the skew theories are now more 
biologically realistic and potentially applicable to more animal societies. 
As we show below, the general model is rich in its predictions, as each sub-
model exhibits different qualitative and quantitative relationships between 
reproductive skew and the ecological and genetic factors that determine skew. We 
derive the ecological and genetic conditions that determine which sub-model applies 
in a given case. The hope is that the general model is rich enough to account for many 
or most of the varied and puzzling patterns of reproductive partitioning encountered in 
recent empirical studies of skew. Moreover, the theoretical generalization presented 
here cleans up and unifies models that previously seemed disconnected. The fast 
proliferation of the seemingly different skew models and the complex predictions of 
these models have raised empiricists’ concern of the difficulty to testing these models 
in the field (e.g. Magrath et al., 2004), so theoretical unification would be highly  
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welcome to empiricists: Unification will greatly facilitate the testing of alternative 
models because we now have a theory of which sub-model should apply in specified 
ecological and genetic conditions. 
We begin by extending the “mutual-pay bordered tug-of-war”, which describes 
the situation that both group members need to yield reproduction to its partner to 
maintain cooperation (Reeve and Shen, 2006), to allow for the possibility that the only 
one or neither individual needs to yield reproduction to its partner to keep the latter in 
the group.  
 
THE BASIC MODEL 
We consider a simple group of two individuals, a dominant and a subordinate. 
Following Reeve et al. (1998), dominance is assumed to be determined by resource-
holding power. The dominant can decide how much fractionx, and the subordinate 
can decide how much fraction y , of the group’s output to invest in the tug-of-war. The 
fraction of non-ceded part of group resources going to the dominant is /( ) x xb y + and 
to the subordinate is /( ) by x by + , where the constant b (ranging from 0 to 1) represents 
the subordinate’s smaller resource holding power (RHP) or competitive efficiency 
compared to the dominant. The actual group output becomes (1 ) Gx y − − , whereG is 
the total group resource. Therefore, thexand y are the selfish efforts because the more 
effort,xor y , put into a tug-of-war, the greater the individual’s relative reproductive 
share but the smaller the group output. The total group resource that is “spent” in the 
competition to increase personal shares (i.e., G(x+y)) measures the degree of within-
group conflict. In addition, individuals may have to yield some reproduction as an 
“incentive” to keep its partner in the group. However, unlike in previous transactional 
models with the complete control assumption, in our model, both the dominant and the 
subordinate must yield a fraction p andq, respectively, of the group resource  
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remaining after the tug-of-war ( (1 ) Gx y − − ) to each other to prevent each other from 
pursuing non-cooperative options, i.e., to maintain group stability. The best available 
non-cooperative option will depend on the species and ecology, but for simplicity, we 
assume that it is to fight for sole possession of the group’s resource, with a 
reproductive output L going to the winner and the solitary breeding payoff S going to 
the loser, whose is forced to disperse. (Therefore, the group output (k) in previous 
versions of transaction models is equivalent to G(1-x-y)/L in this version.) The 
proportion of realized group output that is yielded by the other member to a focal 
individual could be viewed as the focal individual’s “protected share” because it is 
exempt from the costly tug-of-war process. As a consequence, the total share of direct 
reproduction that the subordinate obtains is  
p+ (1− p−q)
by
x + by
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  and the share that the dominant obtains is 
q+ (1− p−q)
x
x + by
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . In this simple dyadic group case, an individual’s inclusive 
fitness (Hamilton,1964) associated with a certain strategy is 
ii i I Pr K =+ ,                                                    (1) 
where i P  is the focal individual’s personal reproduction associated withistrategy, i K is 
the other party’s reproduction if strategyiis performed, and r is the genetic relatedness 
between the two parties. The subordinate’s overall inclusive fitness when staying in 
the group is thus   
(1 ){[ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ]} s
by x
I g G xy p pq r q pq
x by x by
= −− +−− + +−−
++
,       (2) 
and the dominant’s inclusive fitness when staying in the group is  
     (1 ){[ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ]} d
xb y
I g G xy q pq r p pq
x by x by
= −− +−− + +−−
++
.       (3) 
However, both the dominant and the subordinate may choose the non-cooperative 
option, where f is the probability of the subordinate’s winning the fight for the group’s 
resource. We further assume that the probability f of winning a fight is an increasing  
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function of the subordinate’s relative resource holding powerb , i.e., /(1 ) f bb =+ . 
Therefore, the reproductive output for the subordinate’s non-cooperative option, i.e. 
fighting for the territory, is (1 ) fLf S + −  and  (1 ) fSf L + −  is that for the dominant. 
Using Equation (1) and substituting  /(1 ) f bb = + to obtain the subordinate’s inclusive 
fitness associated with the non-cooperative option, we get 
() ( 1)
1
s
Lb r S b r
Is
b
++ +
=
+
,                                      (4) 
and for the dominant 
(1 ) ( )
1
d
Lb r S b r
Is
b
+++
=
+
.                                      (5) 
The group will be stable if  
     s s IgI s > ; and  dd IgI s > .                                      (6a, 6b) 
We use the Inequalities (6a and 6b) to find the minimum incentives, * p and * q , 
that the dominant and the subordinate need to yield to the other party to maintain the 
group’s stability. We seek the Nash equilibrium ( *, * x y , * p , * q ) with the fitness 
function from Equations (2) , (3) and Inequality (9) (Mesterton-Gibbons, 1992). The 
Nash equilibrium in this case is obtained by finding the positive values * x ,  * y , 
* p and  * q simultaneously satisfying  
/0 d Ig x ∂∂ = ; / 0 s Ig y ∂∂ = ;  s s IgI s = ; and  dd IgI s =  
at  * x x = ; * y y = ;* p p = and * qq = . This is a constrained optimization problem, in 
that the evolutionarily stable selfish efforts and incentives depend on the constraints 
that each party must end up with at least as high a fitness by being in the group as by 
taking the non-cooperative option. (Nonacs (2007) was puzzled at how Reeve and 
Shen’s bordered tug-of-war model could yield different conclusions from those of 
Johnstone (2000) since both used the same formulae for inclusive fitnesses for 
cooperation- the answer is that the form of the constraint, which differs in the two  
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approaches, sensitively affects the fitness-maximizing strategies as is generally the 
case in constrained optimization.) 
  The solutions are 
22 3
22 2
2
1
* {[( ) ] [ ( ]
(1 ) ( 1)( )
() [( ) ] ( ) [ ( 1 ) ( )
2( )( ) ( ) ]}
p GLb r s b r s L b L r Sb r
br L S
bG L S L b L r b rs L S r r b L S
bL S L bS r L bS
= + ++ + + +
+− +
+− − ++ + − + + − +
+++ + +
3
2
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(1 )( )[ ]}}
1
q
bb r S L
b G L S L b r S brS b r G bg bL S
rb L S
bL S r r L bS b bL S L bS G r
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bL S r r
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() [ ( )]
(1 )(1 )( )
x
GSLL br Sb r S
Gb r S L
=
−− +++
++ +
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*
() [ ( ) ]
(1 )(1 )( )
y
GSLLS br b L r
Gb r S L
=
−− + + +
++ +
.                                      (7) 
Inspection of Equation (7) immediately reveals that for * x >0 and  * y >0 to be true, the 
inequality  
() GS L >+                                                        (8)   
must be true. Inequality (8) also is derived from the inequality 
(1 * *) 0 pq −−>                                                     (9) 
which must be satisfied if the group is to be stable (if p* and q* sum to greater than 1, 
then it would not be possible for both parties to give incentives large enough to keep 
its partner cooperating in the group). In other words, Inequality (8) must be true for the 
group to be stable, and, if it is stable, then the evolutionarily stable selfish efforts will 
be positive.  
  The solutions in (7) assume that the ecological parameters G, L, and S, the 
competition parameter b, and the genetic relatedness r are such that p* > 0 and q* > 0. 
Nonacs (2007) criticized the mutual-pay bordered tug-of-war model because situations  
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can arise for which p* or q* or both can be less than zero.  However, the proper 
conclusion is that the mutual-pay bordered tug-of-war model simply does not apply to 
such cases, not that it is flawed.  The correct procedure to follow if p* or q* < 0 is to 
set the variables with negative values to zero and then again 
solve / 0 d Ig x ∂∂ = ;/0 s Ig y ∂∂ = ; s s IgI s = ; and  dd IgI s =  for the selfish efforts and for 
the incentives that did not initially come out negative.  We show that doing the latter 
generates the four sub-models together constituting the general bordered tug-of-war: 
the mutual-pay tug-of-war, the pure tug-of-war, the alpha-pay tug-of-war, and the 
beta-pay tug-of-war.  Before doing this, we first need to note the dynamics of the 
decision process assumed by the general bordered tug-of-war model. 
 
DYNAMICS OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE GENERAL TUG-OF-WAR 
    Considerable confusion exists over the dynamics of the decision-making process 
assumed in the transactional models and general BTOW model (Nonacs 2006, 2007). 
It has long been acknowledged that some kind of cheater prevention mechanism is 
necessary for all transactions to be evolutionarily stable (Reeve and Keller, 1997; 
Reeve and Nonacs, 1992). The intuitive explanation is that individuals would always 
benefit by yielding a lesser reproductive share to her partner unless she would respond 
by leaving the group or otherwise punishing her. Therefore, the conceded share is 
determined by the boundary conditions for group stability. This is also why 
transactions can be evolutionarily stable only if individuals can respond to partner’s 
cheating behavior on behavioral time scales (Kokko, 2003). Thus, cheater prevention 
mechanisms, such as punishment and differential partner choice, are implicitly 
assumed in all transactional models of reproductive skew.       
     Since the bordered tug-of-war model is an incomplete control transactional model, 
cheater prevention mechanisms also are assumed in this model. Incorporating the  
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latter assumption, we clarify the decision-making process here to show that some 
recent criticisms of the BTOW approach are incorrect.  The assumed decision 
dynamics are pictured in Fig. 2.1a. At an initial time, the dominant (Dom) and 
subordinate (Sub) each choose their incentives (p* and q*, respectively) and selfish 
efforts (x* and y*, respectively) based on their assessments of all input parameters. 
Each chooses values that maximize its inclusive fitness given that its partner chooses 
values that maximize its own inclusive fitness. Thus, the partner’s fitness-maximizing 
choices are computed by both individuals (since all input variables, including relative 
fighting ability, are assumed assessable by both individuals), and each individual plays 
its “sealed bids” simultaneously, these bids (i.e., incentives and selfish efforts) 
determine the group production and reproductive shares in a small time interval ∆t (the 
interval is “small” compared to the full duration of the cooperative association, not 
necessarily small in absolute duration).  After ∆t, each individual repeats its 
assessments and decisions, altering its computation of its own optima if the latter did 
not behave as computed in the previous time interval. In particular, the observed 
partner’s effort and incentives would be plugged into the focal individual’s new 
optimization procedure.  (If the input variables have the same value in this next time 
interval, the evolutionary stable decisions will remain unaltered as well.)  In sum, we 
assume that each player plays according to the rule: (1) Initially, choose the selfish 
effort and incentive that maximizes the inclusive fitness of cooperation given that the 
partner does the same, and cooperate if this maximal inclusive fitness exceeds that for 
non-cooperation; otherwise, take the non-cooperative option.  (2) Thereafter, repeat 
(1) except use the partner’s previously observed efforts and incentives in the 
calculation of one’s own optimal selfish effort and incentive for cooperation.    
  In this process, the selfish efforts and incentives in (7) are evolutionarily stable 
for the case of p* > 0 and q* > 0. For example, suppose that one individual decreases  
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the conceded incentive to its partner below that specified in (7). Then the partner 
would be favored to take its non-cooperative option in the next small time interval, 
and the focal individual would necessarily experience reduced inclusive fitness (if G > 
S+L) because of the loss of cooperation of its partner. Thus, by not taking into account 
the subsequent, immediate damage-inflicting behavior of its partner, an individual 
skimming the incentives would be behaving sub-optimally. The individual cheated 
upon would have minimal losses in inclusive fitness, because of the small time 
interval involved. (Note: The inclusive fitness expressions in [2] and [3] always 
increase as a partner’s incentive decreases, but this does not mean that incentives 
should not be given, because a decrease in the partner’s incentive causes the inclusive 
fitnesses [2] and [3] to no longer apply, the inclusive fitnesses instead becoming equal 
to the lower values in (4) and (5).  Unfortunately, Nonacs (2007) missed this point in 
erroneous arguments that the bordered tug-of-war reverts to a pure-tug-of-war without 
incentives). Similarly, any elevation in selfish efforts above or below those in (7) 
would trigger subsequent changes in the partner’s selfish efforts that would necessarily 
inflict inclusive fitness losses on the focal individual. It might be thought that reducing 
both incentives and selfish effort simultaneously below the solutions in (7) might yield 
an inclusive fitness advantage while retaining the partner, but this leads to the 
subordinate or dominant responding with increasing selfish effort. After a few steps, 
both group members eventually choose the non-cooperative options because the 
payoffs for both group members are lower than the payoffs obtained by the solutions 
in (7)  (Fig. 2.1b). In sum, the solutions in (7) are stable for p* > 0 and q* > 0. 
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Figure 2.1 (a) Dynamics of decision-making in the synthetic model. At an initial time, 
the dominant (Dom) and subordinate (Sub) each choose their conceded shares 
(p*and q*, respectively) and selfish efforts (x* and y*, respectively) based on 
their assessments of all input parameters; each chooses values that maximize 
its inclusive fitness given that its partner chooses values that maximize its own 
inclusive fitness (the partner’s fitness-maximizing choice is computed by both 
individuals).  After a short time ∆t, each individual repeats its assessments and 
decisions. 
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Figure 2.1 (b) A numerical example shows that a mutant strategy of simultaneously 
decreasing selfish effort, from x* to x*-0.025, and conceded share, from p* to p*-0.1, 
is not stable. This is because if one individual decreases her selfish effort, her partner 
would always gain by increasing its own selfish effort, at the cost of the first 
individual. After a few steps, both group members eventually choose the non-
cooperative options because the payoffs for both group members are lower than the 
payoffs obtained by the solutions in (7). ∆Igd and ∆Igs represent the inclusive fitness 
differences between the mutant strategy (p’,q’,x’,y’) and the strategy corresponding to 
our original solutions (p*,q*,x*,y*,equation 7). Parameter values used in the figure are 
L=1,r=0.25,S=0.8,b=0.6, G=2.5.   
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TRANSITIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT SUB-MODELS 
In the parameter space in which both p* and q* are greater than zero, both the 
dominant and the subordinate benefit by yielding a certain fraction of the group’s 
resource to each other. Therefore, we call this region the “mutual- pay” bordered tug-
of-war, or mutual-pay BTOW (Fig. 2.2 and 2.3; see Reeve and Shen 2006). We can 
also view p* > 0 (or q* > 0) as occurring when the subordinate (or dominant) requires 
a non-zero fraction of reproduction to no longer be favored to choose the non-
cooperative option. As a result, in the mutual-pay BTOW, both the dominant and the 
subordinate achieve almost the same inclusive fitness by staying in the group as they 
would have by choosing their non-cooperative options (Fig. 2.4a and 2.4b).  
Similarly, when p* =0 (or q* =0), the subordinate (or dominant) prefers staying in 
the group even without the other party yielding any fraction of reproduction to it (Fig. 
2.4a and 2.4b). For example, when p* >0 but q* = 0, the subordinate will not choose 
to stay in the group without the dominant’s incentive but the dominant will prefer to 
stay regardless of whether the subordinate yields reproduction or not (Fig. 2.4a and 
2.4b). Because q < 0 is not biologically meaningful, when ecological or genetic 
parameters are such that q* ≤ 0 in (7), we substitute zero for q in Equations (1) and (2) 
to obtain the dominant’s and the subordinate’s inclusive fitness for cooperation as 
follows 
(1 ){[ (1 ) ] [(1 ) ]} s
by x
Ig G x y p p r p
x by x by
=− − + − +−
++
                 (10) 
(1 ){[(1 ) ] [ (1 ) ]} d
xb y
Ig G x y p r p p
x by x by
=− − − ++ −
++
.                 (11) 
The procedure in (7) is then applied to (10) and (11) to solve for p*, x*, and y*, with 
q* = 0.  Unfortunately, the solutions are very cumbersome, so we will examine this 
sub-model numerically below. We term this subset of the model as “α-pay bordered 
tug-of-war”, or α-pay BTOW. Since in α-pay BTOW, only the dominant yields  
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reproduction to keep the subordinate staying in the group, this sub-model is 
conceptually similar to the original concession transactional model (Emlen, 1982; 
Reeve and Ratnieks, 1993; Vehrencamp, 1983). However, the complete control 
assumption is relaxed. As we will show later, the properties of the α-pay BTOW are 
similar to those of the concession model as well.  
     Similarly, we can obtain the “β-pay bordered tug-of-war”, or β-pay BTOW when 
q* ≤ 0 but p* ≥ 0 in (7). The procedure in (7) is now applied to solve for q*, x*, and 
y*, with p* = 0.  Unfortunately, the solutions are very cumbersome, so we will 
examine this sub-model numerically below. The β-pay BTOW model is similar to the 
restraint model (Johnstone and Cant, 1999), in which only the subordinates yields 
reproduction the dominant. Again, unlike in restraint model, we do not assume the 
subordinate has complete control over reproduction.  
  Interestingly, if both q* ≤ 0, and p* ≤ 0 in (7), the inclusive fitnesses for the 
dominant and the subordinate become  
    (1 )[ ] s
by x
Ig G x y r
x by x by
=− − +
++
                              (12) 
(1 )[ ] d
x by
Ig G x y r
x by x by
=− − +
++
,                             (13) 
which are the same as those of the original tug-of-war (TOW) model developed by 
Reeve et al. (1998) except that we addG to describe the total group resource in this 
model. We solve for just x* and y* as in Reeve et al. (1998).  All of the transitions 
between sub-models are summarized in Table 2.1.  
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Figure 2.2 Transitions of different sub-models in relation to group resource (G) and 
genetic relatedness (r). The dash lines represent isoclines where p=0 and solid lines 
indicate parameter space where q=0 and the dash-and-dot lines show the group 
stability threshold (G>S+L).  
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Figure 2.3 Transitions of different sub-models in relation to the subordinate are 
relative competitive efficiency of the subordinate (b) and direct fitness of leaving the 
group (S). The dash lines represent isoclines where p*=0 and solid lines indicate 
parameter space where q*=0 and the dash-and-dot lines show the group stability 
threshold (G>S+L). 
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(a) 
   
 (b) 
 
Figure 2.4 The inclusive fitness of the dominant and the subordinate compared to their 
non-cooperative option in relation to (a) genetic relatedness (r) at G=2.2, L=1,S=0.5, 
b=0.5 and (b)direct fitness of leaving the group (S) at G=2.2, r=0.3, b=0.2, L=1. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of skew predictions of different sub-models. 
 
   BTOW  β-pay   α-pay TOW 
   p*>0,q*>0  p*≤0,q*>0 p*>0,q*≤0 p*≤0,q*≤0 
Inclusive fitness compare 
to non-cooperative option 
Both the same 
β higher,  
α the same   
α higher,  
β the same 
Both higher 
skew versus  r   None  Negative  Positive  None or Negative 
skew versus  G None Negative  Positive  None 
skew versus  L Positive  Negative  Positive  None 
skew versus  S Negative  Positive  Negative  None 
skew versus  b None  Negative  Negative  Negative 
skew versus aggression  Negative  Positive  Negative  None or Negative 
 
PARAMETER SPACES THAT APPLY TO EACH SUB-MODEL 
   As described above, whether an individual must yield group resources as an 
incentive to keep the other member in the group is the key feature to determining the 
transitions between different sub-models (Table 2.1). We can now investigate the 
parameter space that applies to each model (Fig. 2.2 and 2.3).  
  The pure TOW is the case in which both individuals are better off staying in 
the group even without any protected share (p* = 0, and q* =0), which is exactly the 
original tug-of-war model (Reeve et al. 1998). The pure TOW is favored by selection 
when relatednessr between group members is high because within-group conflict is 
lower and therefore no protected share is needed for either party. The pure TOW is 
also favored when (i) group productivityG is high, because leaving the group is 
unattractive in such cases (making incentives unnecessary) and (ii) the direct fitness L  
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of winning a territory fight is low or the losing payoff S is low because incentives are 
again less likely when the non-cooperative option provides a lesser payoff.   
  In the mutual-pay BTOW, both parties require some “protected share” (p* >0, 
q* > 0), with the result that this sub-model applies primarily to situations opposite to 
that favoring the pure TOW, i.e., when relatedness r is low, group productivity G is 
lower, and L and S are higher. The relative competitive efficiency b has little effect on 
the relative favorability of the mutual-pay BTOW or the pure TOW. This is a 
somewhat counter-intuitive result. Although smallerb lowers the payoff a subordinate 
gets in a pure tug-of-war, it also reduces the subordinate’s chances of winning the 
fight if the non-cooperative option is taken, leading to a lower payment by the 
dominant. Such counter-acting effects ofb explains whyb has such little effect on 
whether the mutual-pay BTOW or pure TOW is more likely to apply.  
The remaining two cases, β-pay BTOW and α-pay BTOW, are cases in which only 
one individual needs to yield group resources to keep the other party cooperating in 
the group (i.e, p* > 0 and q* = 0, or vice versa). The key question here is why (in the 
case of α-pay BTOW) only the subordinate should require a protected share, not alpha 
(or vice versa). By definition, the only difference between alpha and beta is their 
relative fighting efficiency (b). This difference in competitive efficiency will cause 
them to have different payoffs for the non-cooperative options (see Equation 3 and 4), 
which are also determined by the reproductive outputs for losing (S) or winning (L) a 
fight. An alpha-pay BTOW is favored over a pure TOW when G is high, r is low, b is 
low and S is high (Fig. 2.2 and 2.3). Under these conditions, low b means that the 
dominant will capture much more reproduction than will the subordinate in a tug-of-
war, so much so that the dominant will be favored to stay even without any additional 
incentives provided by the subordinate.  However, the subordinate does so poorly in 
the tug-of-war that it requires a non-zero protected share to be favored to stay within  
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the group versus take the non-cooperative option. These factors together explain the 
why the dominant often needs to pay the subordinate to keep him or her in the group 
but not the reverse.    
The β-pay BTOW is rarely favored in our model, as a consequence of the above 
reasoning. If the subordinate is competitively similar to the dominant (b near 1), then 
there is nothing to distinguish either, and they will either both be favored to pay 
(mutual BTOW) or both be favored not to pay the other (pure TOW). However, if the 
subordinate is substantially weaker (b low), then it is more likely to demand payment 
when the dominant is not (alpha-pay BTOW), as explained in the previous paragraph. 
 
REPRODUCTIVE SKEW  
The “phase-transition” property of the global BTOW model can be clearly seen in 
that the different sub-models have quite distinctive predictions (Fig. 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 
summarized in Table 2.1). To better show this numerically, all figures in which the 
group productivity (G) and relatedness (r) are varied use the same values for the other 
parameters ( b = 0.5 and S = 0.5). Similarly, all figures in which the payoff of losing 
territory fight (S) and relative competitive efficiency (b) are varied use the same values 
for the other parameters. 
Numerical results indicate that the subordinate’s reproductive share in the mutual-
pay BTOW increases (i.e., skew decreases) with an increase in the subordinate’s 
relative competitive efficiency b, group productivity G, and the payoff for leaving S, 
but is not affected by relatedness r (Fig. 2.5 a, 2.5b). In the mutual-pay BTOW, the 
reproductive share of each party is sensitively determined by the payoff of the non-
cooperative option. Increases in G and S and f through increases in b all increase the 
payoff for the subordinate’s non-cooperative option and thus the incentive paid to the 
subordinate by the dominant (Reeve and Shen, 2006). However, increasing relatedness  
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has no effect on the skew because it affects the intensity of the internal tug-of-war and 
the magnitudes of the incentives oppositely.  
The α-pay BTOW is conceptually similar to the concession model and has similar 
properties and predictions as does the concession model (Reeve and Ratnieks,1993), 
i.e,  the subordinate’s share will increase as group productivity and the payoff for 
leaving increase but decreases as relatedness decreases (Fig. 2.5 a, 2.5b). In addition, 
the subordinate’s reproductive share increases with the increase of her competitive 
efficiency because (i) she will do better in the tug-of-war and (ii) an increase in her 
competitive efficiency increases the payoff for the non-cooperative option by 
increasing her probability of winning a fight.  In contrast, β-pay BTOW has properties 
similar to those of the original restraint transactional model (Johnstone and Cant 
1999). Its predictions are opposite to those of the α-pay BTOW except that the 
subordinate with higher competitive efficiency will still have a higher overall 
reproductive share than the weaker one (owing to the former’s better performance in 
the tug-of-war).  
In the pure TOW, the subordinate’s share is not affected by group productivity and 
the payoff for leaving, and it increases as the subordinate’s relative fighting ability 
increases. The relatedness has either no effect or a negative effect on the subordinate’s 
share, as described by Reeve et al. (1998).  
 
DEGREE OF WITHIN-GROUP CONFLICT  
We distinguish between destruction, the fraction of maximal group output used up 
in the tug-of-war, and aggression. Destruction is the same as an individual’s selfish 
effort in the tug-of-war (x and y for dominant and subordinate, respectively). 
Aggression, on the other hand, is the degree of actual behavioral conflict that directly 
determines reproductive share in a tug-of-war: Aggression takes both competitive  
 47   
efficiency and selfish effort into account (x and by are the aggression levels for 
dominant and subordinate, respectively) and represents the observed conflict level.  
Overall aggression and selfish effort in the general BTOW model are determined by 
the disparities between potential group resources and the payoffs of the individuals’ 
non-cooperative options. In other words, the greater such disparity, the more each 
individual gains by conflict (Table 2.2). This explains the similar predictions of 
mutual-pay BTOW, α-pay BTOW, and β-pay BTOW: aggression and destruction 
increase as group resources G increase and decrease as the direct fitness of losing (S) 
or winning (L) a fight increases (Fig. 2.6 a, 2.6c). Intriguingly, then, the general model 
predicts higher levels of conflict within groups that are increasingly stable. The same 
logic could also be used to explain why these three factors don’t affect the degree of 
conflict in a pure TOW: When the pure TOW is favored, the payoffs for both parties 
cooperating in the group without incentives are still higher than the payoffs for their 
non-cooperative options. Therefore, the non-cooperative option does not affect levels 
of destruction and aggression. 
When genetic relatedness is high, both parties’ genetic interests are aligned. Thus, 
the total amount of destruction and aggression is low in the alpha-pay BTOW, beta-
pay BTOW and pure TOW (Fig. 2.6b, 2.6d). However, relatedness doesn’t affect the 
degree of conflict in the mutual-pay BTOW. In the mutual-pay BTOW higher 
relatedness reduces the incentives, widening the tug-of-war zone, but also increases 
the indirect fitness losses for engaging in a tug-of-war with a relative, and these two 
effects exactly cancel. 
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Table 2.2. Summary of level-of-conflict predictions of different sub-models. 
                 
   BTOW  β-pay BTOW  α-pay BTOW  TOW 
Level of conflict versus  r   None  Negative  Negative  Negative 
Level of conflict versus  G Positive  Positive  Positive  None 
Level of conflict versus  L Negative  Negative  Negative  None 
Level of conflict versus  S Negative  Negative  Negative  None 
Level of conflict versus  b Positive  Negative  Positive  Positive   
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Figure 2.5a. The reproductive skew in relation to group productivity (G) and 
relatedness (r) at s=0.5, b=0.5, which correspond to the middle figure of figure 3. 
 
Figure 2.5b The reproductive skew in relation to  solitary payoff of losing (S) and 
relative competitive efficiency of the subordinate (b) at r=0.5, G=2, which correspond 
to the middle figure of figure 2.  
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a. 
   
 
b. 
   
c.   d. 
   
 
Figure 2.6 The level of destruction in relation to (a) group productivity (G) and 
relatedness (r) at S=0.5, b=0.5; and (b) solitary payoff of losing (S)and relative 
competitive efficiency of the subordinate (b) at r=0.5, G=2; and the level of 
aggression in relation to (c) group productivity (G) and relatedness (r); and (d) solitary 
payoff of losing (S) and relative competitive efficiency of the subordinate (b) at the 
same parameter spaces as 5(a) and 5(b) 
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COMPARISON OF DOMINANT’S AND SUBORDINATE’S SELFISH EFFORTS 
AND AGGRESSION 
In most of the investigated parameter space, the subordinate has higher level of 
selfish effort than does the dominant (Fig. 2.7a, 2.7b). This occurs because the 
dominant has a greater share of the group output and thus is harmed more by using up 
a fixed fraction of that output in the tug-of-war. In the alpha-pay BTOW region, the 
disparity between the dominant’s and subordinate’s selfishish efforts increases as the 
relatedness decreases.  As the relatedness decreases, the subordinate is less harmed by 
indirect fitness losses by using up group-output in the tug-of-war. When solitary 
payoff for losing a territory fight S is lower, the subordinate also tends to have a 
relatively higher selfish effort. The latter occurs because low S means that its likely 
payoff for non-cooperation is especially poor and therefore it will receive a small 
incentive, reducing its direct fitness loss for using up group output in the tug-of-war. 
      In contrast, the dominant has a higher aggression level than the subordinate in 
most of the parameter space, except when the subordinate’s competitive efficiency is 
very low (Fig. 2.7c, 2.7d). This is because the subordinate’s competitive efficiency is 
lower, which usually more than compensates for its higher selfish effort.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 52   
 
 
a. 
   
b.  
 
c. 
   
d.  
 
 
Figure 2.7 The relative level of destruction in relation to (a) group productivity (G) 
and relatedness (r) at s=0.5, b=0.5; and (b) solitary payoff of losing (S) and relative 
competitive efficiency (b) at r=0.5, G=2; and the relative level of aggression in 
relation to (c) group productivity (G) and relatedness (r); and (d) solitary payoff of 
losing (S) and relative competitive efficiency of the subordiante (b) at the same 
parameter spaces as 5(a) and 5(b) 
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DISCUSSION 
The model described here fully unifies transactional and tug-of-war models of 
reproductive skew. This unification potentially will help to resolve several raging 
controversies and expand the applicability of reproductive skew theories. These 
controversies include the realism of theoretical assumptions of the models and the 
difficulties of empirical tests among the myriad models. Among the assumptions, the 
one that legitimately raises the most concern is the “complete control assumption”, 
which assumes that dominant individuals have complete control over breeding so that 
the reproductive share of each party can be solved (Vehrencamp 1983, Reeve and 
Ratnieks 1993). Our model relaxes this by allowing both the dominant and the 
subordinate to have partial control over reproduction and to allocate selfish effort to 
fight for personal reproduction. The results suggest that dominants are very unlikely to 
have complete control over reproduction, as assumed by previous transactional 
models, even when dominants are vastly more efficient than subordinates. It is almost 
inevitable for the subordinate to put at least some selfish effort into a costly fight, to 
which the dominant responds with his or her own selfish effort. Thus, complete 
control should probably not ever be assumed.  
 In addition, the unified model presented here indicates that four major 
reproductive skew models with strikingly different assumptions and predictions can 
actually be viewed as flowing from a general over-arching model. For instance, the 
original concession transactional model assumes that the dominant has complete 
control over both reproduction and group membership and doles out reproductive 
shares, whereas the eviction model assumes that the dominant is in control of group 
membership but the subordinate has full control over reproduction and doles out the 
reproductive shares (Buston et al., 2007; Johnstone and Cant, 1999; Reeve and 
Ratnieks, 1993). Therefore, these two models are analogous to the α-pay BTOW and  
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β-pay BTOW, which have parallel predictions to the concession and eviction models. 
However, in the BTOW model the subordinate by definition will have lower RHP to 
compete for group resources, and therefore, will never have a higher share of 
reproduction than the dominant.  Moreover, the alpha-pay and beta-pay BTOW 
models, unlike the concession and restraint models, make precise predictions about the 
levels of conflict within-groups and how these levels of conflict will be affected by 
genetic and ecological factors. 
By unifying the models into one synthetic framework, our model makes testing 
alternative models empirically more feasible. The results suggest that β-pay BTOW is 
unlikely in most of the parameter spaces, at least when the subordinate’s probability of 
winning the fight in the non-cooperative option parallels its relative competitive 
efficiency. Thus, in general, empirical tests should probably focus on mutual-pay 
BTOW, α-pay BTOW, and pure TOW models. We suggest that testing a suite of 
predictions will generally be the most conclusive way to distinguish alternative models 
(Langer et al. 2004). For example, when these three models have different predictions 
regarding relatedness and skew, such relatedness versus skew data are informative. 
However, it would be more conclusive if at least one other (preferably distinctive) 
prediction could also be tested so that the possibility of a false support could be 
decreased. Therefore, if we obtain evidence that the dominant has higher inclusive 
fitness in the group and the subordinate has similar fitness in the group compared to 
her non-cooperative options, and reproductive skew increases as relatedness increases, 
this would be clear support for the α-pay BTOW. The problem of confounding effects 
could also be minimized in this way (Clutton-Brock, 1998; Emlen, 1996; Magrath and 
Heinsohn, 2000; Magrath et al., 2004).  
Another approach to evaluating which models are potentially relevant to a 
particular system is to measure the values for at least two model input variables and  
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then determine which models are most applicable for this parameter space. For 
example, consider the acorn woodpecker, in which both males and females often co-
breed (Haydock and Koenig, 2002, 2003). Estimates for r among cobreeders have 
been estimated to be 0.46 for males and 0.41 for females and relative group 
productivity is 1.529 for males and 1.472 for females. Since G is the total group 
resource, some of which may be spent in costly competition, the value of G must be 
greater than or equal to relative group productivity. These values indicate that the most 
appropriate parameter space for both sexes is represented by the first and second rows 
in the middle column in Fig. 2.3. In the case of females, the relative competitive 
ability of cobreeders is almost certainly very similar (b = 1), as indicated by the 
potential reciprocal nature of egg destruction (W. Koenig, pers. comm.). For males, 
this parameter is not as obvious, but b is likely to be fairly high. Meanwhile, S, the 
relative fitness payoff to an individual who fights and loses, is probably low for both 
sexes, given the difficulty of successful dispersal. This places both sexes in the 
parameter space where the pure TOW or mutual-pay BTOW are likely to be 
applicable, with a small chance that α-pay BTOW is applicable to cobreeder males. 
For females, there appears to be no relationship between skew and relatedness, and 
egg destruction occurs regardless of whether cobreeders are related (W. Koenig, pers. 
comm.), results that are consistent only with the BTOW model (Table 2.1 and 2.2). 
For males, skew decreases when the direct fitness of dispersing (S) increases and when 
relatedness increases, results that are consistent only with the α-pay BTOW. 
Additional work will be required to confirm the appropriateness of the models in these 
cases. Another example is from primitively eusocial bees, in which the group 
productivity is very high in rich floral habitat (3.4 to 5.3, Hogendoorn and Zammit, 
2001; Langer et al., 2004). Our model predicts that the pure TOW is favored in all  
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possible parameter spaces, as found in a series of elegant experiments (Langer et al., 
2004).  
We point out that even within the same population of the same species, it is 
possible that multiple mechanisms of resolving breeding conflict (and thus different 
models) could be applied. For instance, different relatednesses between group 
members in different groups and different group productivity in relation to habitat 
quality, seasonality or other ecological factors might result in different conflict 
resolution mechanisms within different groups of the same species. This possibility 
provides another powerful way to test different models’ predictions. For example, it 
would be interesting to see whether primitively eusocial bees will shift to using a 
mutual-pay BTOW to resolve their breeding conflict in high-quality habitats (Langer 
et al., 2004).   
In conclusion, we unify seemingly different models into a general theoretical 
framework. The concession, eviction, pure tug-of-war, and mutual pay, bordered tug-
of-war models now should be considered as sub-models of a general model. The most 
controversial “complete control” assumption of transactional skew models has been 
relaxed. The result is a theory rich in specific predictions, perhaps rich enough to 
accommodate much of the substantial variation in patterns of skew observed across 
vertebrates and invertebrates.  
We suggest further research that in addition to determining which model is 
suitable for certain species, more effort should focus on understanding why and how 
various social animals resolve their breeding conflict by different conflict resolution 
mechanisms. These results could potentially shed the light for the development of a 
general theory of social evolution.   
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CHPATER 3 
PARENTAL CARE, COSTLY YOUNG AND REPRODUCTIVE SKEW: A 
GENERAL MODEL OF PARENTAL INVESTMENT IN COOPERATIVELY 
BREEDING SOCIETIES 
ABSTRACT 
Understanding the mechanisms by which animals resolve conflicts of interest is the 
key to understanding the basis of cooperation in social species. Conflict over 
reproductive shares is the critical type of conflict among cooperative breeders. The 
costly young model represents an important, but underappreciated, idea about how an 
individual’s intrinsic condition and cost of reproduction should affect the resolution of 
conflict over the distribution of reproduction within a cooperatively breeding group. 
However, dominant control in various forms is assumed in previous versions of costly 
young models. In this paper, we first relax the control assumption of costly young 
models, and then develop a general model of cost of reproduction by relaxing the fixed 
parental care assumption of the original costly young model. After relaxing the control 
assumption, we found that relatedness has little effect on the subordinate's 
reproductive share, which is different from the “beneficial sharing” effect in previous 
costly young models where the subordinate's share increases as relatedness increases. 
We further relax the fixed group productivity assumption of the costly young model 
and allow individuals to adjust their parental effort and offspring production. This 
parental investment model predicts that the total group output increases as relatedness 
increases and reproductive share is insensitive to changes in relatedness between 
group members; these results are similar to the tug-of-war models. However, the 
underlying mechanisms explaining the group productivity predictions are different. 
Group productivity is modulated by within-group conflict in the tug-of-war model but  
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is determined by parental effort in our parental investment model. Nonetheless, 
reproductive share is predicted to be insensitive to relatedness in both models because 
group members are predicted to decrease their competitive effort in both cases. These 
results, we believe, help identify the similarities and key differences between different 
models and simplify the seemingly divergent predictions of different reproductive 
skew models.    
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 INTRODUCTION 
Reproductive skew refers to the partitioning of reproduction among same sex 
individuals within social groups and has been identified as a major dimension along 
which animal societies vary (Sherman et al. 1995). The development of the simple 
modeling framework of skew theories with their general predictions has stimulated 
many theoretical and empirical studies in diverse taxa (reviews in Reeve and Keller 
2001, Johnstone 2000, Magrath et al. 2004). Two major kinds of reproductive skew 
models, based on different conflict resolution mechanisms, are transactional models 
and tug-of-war models. In transactional models (Emlen 1982; Keller & Reeve 1994; 
Reeve & Ratnieks 1993; Vehrencamp 1980; Vehrencamp 1983), a single dominant 
individual is assumed to fully control both group membership and the fraction of total 
group reproduction obtained by the subordinate breeder. The dominant breeder 
maximizes its own fraction of reproduction at the expense of the subordinate, but 
yields just enough reproduction to the subordinate to make it favorable for the 
subordinate to stay in the group. In tug-of-war models, on the other hand, no 
individual may have complete control of the reproductive partitioning, and the 
reproductive skew may be determined instead by competitive 'tugs-of-war' among 
group members (Reeve et al. 1998). Each group member is assumed to decide what 
fraction of the group’s resources to expend in increasing its share of the group 
reproduction, and the share each group member receives depends on the ratio of these 
selfish investments. 
   Many empirical studies have been focused on distinguishing the transactional 
and tug-of-war models, especially on testing the “complete-control” assumption of the 
transactional model (Cant 2000; Clutton-Brock 1998; Haydock & Koenig 2002; 
Packer et al. 2001). These authors have argued that it is unlikely for a dominant 
individual to exert complete control over others’ reproduction and therefore have  
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embraced the tug-of-war model as being more applicable to their findings. The recent 
develop of the bordered tug-of-war model (or incomplete-control transactional model) 
has relaxed the complete- control assumption of the transactional model (Reeve & 
Shen 2006; Shen & Reeve in review). This theoretical advance shows that the 
complete-control assumption is not necessary for the transactional type of conflict 
resolution mechanism to occur and that evidence of incomplete control does not 
automatically prove the pure tug-of-war to be operating. For example, in subsocial 
beetles Parastizopus armaticeps, no overt aggression was observed between 
communally laying females, which does not fit the tug-of-war model unless the 
competition is non-aggressive, i.e. exploitative. Reproduction was shared between 
closely related females, but reproductive share was closely correlated with individual 
body condition and not determined by social suppression. Therefore, the transactional 
model also does not seem to apply (Heg et al. 2006). It is clear that additional conflict 
resolution mechanisms besides the transactional and tug-of-war mechanisms should be 
incorporated into skew theory.       
 The costly young model represents another important, but overlooked, idea of 
how an individual’s intrinsic condition and cost of reproduction could affect the 
distribution of reproduction within social groups (Cant 1998; Cant & Johnstone 1999). 
However, various forms of dominant control are assumed in different versions of 
costly young models. In addition, parental care is assumed to be fixed in the original 
costly young model. Here, we first relax the assumption of complete control of the 
costly young model, and secondly, we develop a general parental investment model to 
include the elements of cost of reproduction and parental care. Our results show that 
(1) in relaxing the complete-control assumption, the costly young model behaves very 
differently from the original model and (2) in relaxing the fixed parental care 
assumption, the general parental investment model displays similar predictions to the  
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tug-of-war model, although the underlying mechanisms causing these similar patterns 
are different. These results, we believe, help identify the similarities and key 
differences between different models and simplify the seemingly divergent predictions 
of different reproductive skew models. 
 
THE MODEL 
The modified costly young model with simultaneous solution   
We consider a two-person model without dominance. For ease of comparison with 
previous models, two group members, referred to as Alpha and Beta, both contribute 
to a communal brood, and we ask how reproduction will be partitioned between them. 
Alpha produces n offspring and Beta produces f offspring. The total clutch size is 
denoted t (=n+f). Following Cant and Johnstone (1999), we assume that an individual 
offspring’s fitness, s(t), declines linearly with brood size, t, so that s(t)=1-kt, where k 
is a measure of the sensitivity of offspring to increasing clutch size. The total 
productivity of a clutch of size t is  
   () ( 1 ) Tt t k t = − .                                   (1) 
We also assume that the cost of producing n young is equal to en
2, where e is a 
constant describing the degree of current reproductive effort affecting future 
reproduction. The conclusions of the model are not affected by different power values 
of the cost functions. We can find the optimum clutch size for a single breeder by 
maximizing F(n), the net benefit of producing n young. F(n) is given by  
  
2 () ( 1 ) Fn n k n e n =−−                              (2) 
Solving for n, a single female’s optimum clutch size, we obtain  
  
1 ˆ
2( )
n
ke
=
+
                                      (3) 
The direct fitness F(n) of a female breeding solitarily can be obtained by substituting 
equation (3) into (2), which is   
 65 
  
2 1
( )() [ 2 () ]
4
F n ek ek =+− +                           (4) 
Next, we consider what happens when two females contribute to a joint clutch 
by finding expressions for the inclusive fitness payoff to Alpha and Beta as functions 
of n and f. The cost of producing n and f young are aen
2 and ef
2 for Alpha and Beta, 
respectively, where a is a constant between 0 and 1 to express the greater efficiency, 
or lower cost, of reproduction for Alpha relative to Beta, which may be caused by 
differences in body condition, experience, or resource access. Combining all above 
factors, we can write Alpha’s direct fitness function, wα, and Beta’s, wβ, as follows:  
   2 ()
n
wT n f a e n
nf
α =+ −
+
,   (5a) 
   2 ()
f
wT n f e f
nf
β =+ −
+
        (5b)  
  (note:  () Tn f +  is the same function as equation 1) 
The inclusive fitnesses of Alpha and Beta are  
  Wwr w α α β =+ ,Wwr w ββ α = +                 (6)                                                
Unlike the original costly young model (Cant 1998, Cant and Johnstone1999), 
we do not assume that Alpha has full control over the distribution of reproduction, i.e. 
where both Alpha and Beta maximize Alpha’s inclusive fitness. Thus, we seek the 
Nash equilibrium at which neither player can gain by altering its level of investment 
with the payoffs being calculated from equation 3a and 3b. The best level of 
investment for Alpha and Beta are considered simultaneously by finding the positive 
values {n*,f*} satisfying  
    /0 ,    /0 ,   Wn Wf αβ ∂∂ = ∂∂ = at n=n*, f=f*.  
  The solutions are  
   2( 1 )
*
4 ( ) [4 ( 1)(3 )]
ek r
n
c e ek kek r r
+ −
=
++ − − +
          (7a) 
   2( 1 )
*
4 ( ) [4 ( 1)(3 )]
ce k r
f
c e ek kek r r
+ −
=
++ − − +
         (7b)  
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and they are fitness maxima (
22 /0 ,    /0   Wn Wf αβ ∂ ∂< ∂ ∂<). This solution is biologically 
meaningful only if f*≥0 and n*≥0.  For f*≥0 and n*≥0 to be true, the inequality 
                                     2
1
ce
r
k
<+  
must be satisfied. Since r is always smaller than 1, f*≥0 and n*≥0 are always true.  
 
Results of the modified costly young model  
When we relax the assumption that Alpha has complete control over Beta’s 
reproduction, we find that both Alpha and Beta’s clutch sizes (n* and f*) decrease as 
the relative cost of young (e) increases (Fig. 3.1a), whereas in the complete-control 
version of the costly young model, only Alpha’s clutch size decreases with an increase 
in the relative cost of young. Beta’s clutch size either increases or stays constant (Fig. 
2 in Cant and Johnstone 1999). This happens because if Alpha has complete control, 
Alpha’s clutch size is mainly limited by her own tradeoff between current and further 
reproduction. Therefore, as the cost of young increases, Alpha’s clutch size decreases 
and if Alpha’s clutch size does not reach the most productive clutch size of the brood 
(see equation 1), Alpha’s would benefit by letting Beta reproduce if Beta is her 
relative. This is also why the “beneficial sharing” effect, in which Beta’s share 
increases as relatedness increases, is observed in the complete-control costly young 
model but disappears in our no-control model. Beta’s share is constant regardless of 
relatedness (Fig. 3.1b). Also, both Alpha and Beta’s clutch sizes decrease when 
relatedness increases in our model (fig 3.1c), which is caused by the assumption that 
offspring survival is lower as number of offspring increases in the no-control costly 
young model (see equation 1). Therefore, when Alpha and Beta are more closely 
related to each other, both Alpha and Beta’s clutch size decrease so that the joint 
clutch size (n*+f*) is closer to the most productive size. This also explains why the 
total group output, (n*+f*)(1-k(n*+f*), stays unchanged as relatedness increases in the  
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no-control costly young model but increases with the increase of  relatedness in the 
complete-control model (Fig. 3.1d). In the no-control costly young model, individuals 
decrease their own clutch sizes as relatedness increases, and hence the survival of each 
offspring increases. The cancellation of these two effects results in constant brood 
productivity with smaller clutch sizes as relatedness increases. However, in the 
complete-control costly young model, Alpha lets Beta produce more offspring when 
Beta is more closely related. This happens because the negative survival effect on 
Alpha’s offspring, as Beta produces more offspring, can be compensated by the 
increase in total productivity of the joint clutch. Nonetheless, the total group output is 
higher when no one has control than when Alpha has complete control over 
reproduction (Fig. 3.1d).   
 
Parental investment model  
In this section, we develop a more general costly young model by allowing 
individuals to freely adjust their parental effort instead of assuming a fixed clutch size-
productivity function. Again, we consider a two-person model without dominance. 
The two group members are still referred to as Alpha and Beta, and both contribute to 
a communal clutch. Alpha produces n offspring and Beta produces f offspring. As 
before, the cost of producing n and f young are aen
2 and ef
2 for Alpha and Beta, where 
a is still the constant indicating the greater efficiency of reproduction for Alpha 
relative to Beta. However, in this model, instead of assuming that offspring survival 
decreases with the increase in total number of offspring, we model a more general 
scenario of how parental care affects the reproductive value of offspring (Fisher 1930). 
The more parental care an offspring receives, the higher its reproductive value or 
expected future reproduction. Therefore, offspring production is limited by the cost of  
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(a) 
   
(b)  
 
 (c) 
 
(d) 
 
Figure 3.1 Results of the incomplete-control costly young model. (a) clutch size in 
relation to relative cost of young; The effect of relatedness on (b) Beta’s reproductive 
share, (c) clutch size and (d) total group output. Relaxing the complete-control 
assumption changes the properties of the costly young models.  
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producing young and the cost of parental care. Specifically, Alpha invests d in 
parental care and Beta invests s in parental care in the current breeding attempt and the 
cost of parental care is avd
2 and vs
2 for Alpha and Beta, respectively, where v (for 
investment) is the scaling factor for relative cost of parental care. Again, the 
conclusions of the model are not affected by different power values of the cost 
functions. Since the general power functions, vd
m, vs
m and en
z, ef
z, do not yield 
analytic solutions, we use the squared cost functions here for simplicity. Alpha and 
Beta’s direct fitness functions are summarized as follows: 
   22 () ( )
n
wd s a v d e n
nf
α =+ − +
+
 (8a) 
   22 ()
f
wd s v s e f
nf
β =+ − −
+
 (8b). 
We use equations (8) and (6) to obtain Alpha and Beta’s inclusive fitness 
functions, Wα  and Wβ and seek the Nash equilibrium {n*,f*,d*,s*} by simultaneously 
finding positive values {n*,f*,d*,s*} satisfying 
/0 ,    /0 ,/0 ,    /0 ,   Wn Wf Wd Ws αβ αβ ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ =at n=n*, f=f*,d=d*, and s=s*. The 
solutions are  
22 2 2
22
2* 2* 2 * 2 * ( 1)(1 ) ( ** )
(1 )
*
2
ad e ad er aes aers a a e r d s
aa e
n
−+ − ++ + −+
−
=−  
(9a),
22 2
22
22 2 2
2* 2* 2 * 2 * ( 1)( ** )
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*
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(9b), 
  
32 2
22
(1 ) ( 1 )
*
2( 1)
av r a va r
d
aa v
− +−
=−
−
(9c), and  
  
32 2
2
(1 ) ( )
*
2( 1)
av r a vr a
s
aa v
− +−
=−
−
(9d)   
    (note: d*=eq.9c and s*=eq. 9d in equation 9a and 9b). 
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Results of the parental investment model  
In this model, we assume that individuals do not discriminate their own offspring from 
other group members’ offspring, and that parental care (d and s) is necessary for 
increasing offspring reproductive value. Therefore, parental care can be viewed as 
investing in the creation of common group resources. Offspring production (n and f), 
on the other hand, is a means of competing for group resources, because as one group 
member increases her offspring production it lowers her collaborator's share of the 
group resources. Therefore, as relatedness increases, both Alpha and Beta’s clutch 
sizes decrease (Fig. 3.2a) and levels of parental care increase (Fig. 3.2b). The 
simultaneous adjusting of parental care and offspring production also leads to the 
result that reproductive share is insensitive to differences in relatedness (Fig. 3.2c). 
This also explains why the total group output, (d+s)(n+f), increases as relatedness 
increases (Fig. 3.2d), mainly because individual parental care levels increase as 
relatedness increases. This result is different from the no-control costly young model, 
in which the total group output is unchanged as relatedness increases. This is  because 
in the original costly young model, the clutch size-group productivity relationship is 
assumed to be fixed and parental care is also implicitly fixed, regardless of the 
relatedness between group members. Note that the slight decrease in total group output 
when relatedness is very high (>0.5) is caused by a faster rate of decreasing clutch size 
than parental care. In this case, individuals still have higher inclusive fitness when 
breeding with more closely related group members but save more energy for future 
reproduction. Different power values of the cost functions give different quantitative 
results, but the qualitative relationship between total group output and relatedness is 
similar.  
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Table  3.1. Predictions of the effect of relatedness on different phenomena in different 
models. The effect of relatedness assumes that other parameters and group size are 
held constant. 
 
Skew model's predicted association of relatedness with different phenomena 
    costly young  investment pure tug-of-war 
    complete 
control  no-control         
Skew   negative  none*   none*    none*   
Within-group conflict  -  -  -  negative 
Parental effort   -  -  positive  - 
Total group output   positive   none  positive  positive 
Clutch size   positive   negative  negative  - 
  α  β      
Lifetime direct fitness  -
＃ +
＃ Positive Positive  Positive 
Lifetime inclusive fitness  -  +  Positive  Positive  Positive 
*Skew slightly increases as relatedness increases when b is very small. 
＃”+” indicates “positive”; “-“ represents negative relationship. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c)   (d) 
 
Figure 3.2 The effect of relatedness on (a) clutch size, (b) level of parental care, (c) 
Beta’s reproductive share, and (d) total group output in the parental investment models 
of reproductive skew, which relaxes the fixed group productivity of costly young 
models (see text).   
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DISCUSSION 
Our modified costly young model describes how the cost of reproduction affects the 
distribution of reproduction in a cooperative breeding group in the absence of social 
suppression. Various forms of social suppression are assumed in previous versions of 
costly young models. In Cant’s (1998) original model, Alpha sets her optimal clutch 
size first and then adjusts again after Beta makes her decision according to Alpha’s 
first move. As the author correctly points out, this gives Alpha an advantage and 
imposes constraints on Beta for seeking her own optimal production of young. In the 
subsequent model (Cant and Johnstone 1999), Alpha is assumed to have complete 
control over the distribution of reproduction, such that both Alpha and Beta produce 
the clutch sizes that maximize Alpha’s inclusive fitness; or Alpha yields a minimum 
proportion of reproduction to retain Beta in the group, as assumed in the standard 
transactional model (Vehrencamp 1983, Reeve and Ratnieks 1993). However, the 
complete-control assumption is not realistic (Clutton-Brock 1998; Reeve & Shen 
2006). Our model relaxes these assumptions by seeking the Nash equilibrium of 
Alpha's and Beta’s clutch sizes. Our modification of the costly young models allows 
us to examine how different cost functions affect individual reproductive shares. 
Interestingly, our model predicts that relatedness has either no effect or a negative 
effect on Beta’s reproductive share. The “beneficial sharing” effect discovered in 
previous costly young models, where Beta has a larger share while the number of 
young produced by Alpha decreases with an increase in relatedness,  disappears in our 
model. This makes sense, because without the complete-control assumption, the 
different clutch sizes that Alpha and Beta produce are due to the different costs of 
producing young. Therefore, Alpha's and Beta’s clutch size functions (n* and f*) have 
similar dependences on the other variables in the model. In the subsocial beetle 
Parastizopus armaticeps, no overt female-female aggression was seen and the higher  
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share of reproduction obtained by a communally breeding female was considered to be 
the result of good condition instead of social suppression (Heg et al. 2006). This 
finding provides some preliminary support for our modified costly young model. In a 
comparative study of cooperatively breeding carnivores, Creel and Creel (1991) found 
that skew is highest among those carnivores with the highest costs of breeding. They 
hypothesized that as energetic costs increase, subordinates are more likely to have a 
fitness cost that exceeds the expected fitness benefit of breeding directly. However, 
our model shows that the high cost of reproduction alone is not sufficient to explain 
high skew (see also Russell 2004). One possible explanation, based on our model, is 
that body condition of dominants in those species with a high cost of reproduction is 
much better than the subordinates (helpers). Nevertheless, mechanisms such as active 
dominant suppression of subordinate reproduction in order to get subordinates’ help in 
parental care when energetic cost of breeding is high (e.g. Scantlebury et al. 2002), are 
not implicitly included in our model. Further modeling effort is needed. 
In addition to the complete-control assumption, the original costly young 
model also assumed a fixed clutch size-productivity function. In other words, it was 
implicitly assumed that individuals do not adjust their parental effort to the number of 
offspring they have in the current brood. This assumption is similar to the classic skew 
models which also assumed automatic group benefit (Keller & Reeve 1994; Reeve & 
Ratnieks 1993), but as many authors have pointed out, the fixed group benefit 
assumption might not be biologically realistic (Johnstone 2000; Magrath & Heinsohn 
2000; Magrath et al. 2004). We also relaxed this fixed productivity assumption and in 
Table 3.1 compare the predictions of this general parental investment model with other 
models, including the complete-control costly model (Cant & Johnstone 1999), the no-
control costly young model (this paper) and pure tug-of-war model (Reeve et al. 
1998).   
 75 
Interestingly, after relaxing the assumption of complete control and fixed 
parental care, the general parental investment model has predictions similar to the pure 
tug-of-war model. Both models predict that reproductive share is insensitive to the 
relatedness between group members and that group productivity increases as 
relatedness increases. Selfish effort in the tug-of-war model and offspring production 
in the costly young model are both group members’ competitive strategies, which 
increase personal direct fitness and decrease the other group member’s direct fitness. 
This explains why reproductive share is predicted to be insensitive to the change of 
relatedness in both models, because as relatedness increases, the conflict of genetic 
interests between group members decreases. Therefore, Alpha and Beta are both 
predicted to decrease their selfish effort and offspring production by each model, 
which causes the prediction of insensitivity of reproductive share to differences in 
relatedness in both models (Reeve et al. 1998). However, selfish effort and offspring 
production are different in the sense that a higher level of selfish effort always 
decreases total group output and decreases other group members’ inclusive fitness. 
But production of offspring could either increase or decrease total group output and 
the partner’s inclusive fitness, depending on the cost of offspring production and 
parental care.  
Although both tug-of-war and parental investment models predict that total 
group output increases as relatedness increases, the underlying mechanisms causing 
this similar prediction are different. In the pure tug-of-war model, group members 
engage in costly competition at the expense of group resources. Group members can 
freely decide their level of selfish effort, which decreases total group output but 
increases an individual’s personal share of group resources. Group members’ selfish 
efforts decrease as relatedness increases, and therefore the total group output increases 
with an increase in relatedness because of lowered within-group conflict. However, in  
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the parental investment model, the tradeoff between current and further reproduction 
is considered. Current reproductive investment is further divided into parental care and 
offspring production. As relatedness increases, individuals invest more in current 
reproduction, which causes the increase in total group output.  
The tug-of-war model is a broad framework describing “the tragedy of the 
commons” phenomenon (Hardin 1968; Rankin et al. 2007). Many conflicts related to 
reproduction, such as aggressive suppression of subordinates (Young et al. 2006), 
infanticide (Koenig et al. 1995; Vehrencamp 1977; Young & Clutton-Brock 2006) or 
even non-aggressive exploitative types of competition can be considered in this 
framework, as long as they increase personal share at the expense of group output. The 
parental investment model, on the other hand, has a property similar to the “paradox of 
collective action” (Brown 1999; Olson 1965; Sandler 1992): if group benefits are 
created by group members’ contributions at their own costs and the group benefits are 
available to all group members, individuals could gain by not investing or investing 
less to the creation of the group benefits. Since we do not assume discriminate parental 
care, parental care provided by group members creates common group resources, 
which are available to every group member. However, in our model, group members 
could simultaneously adjust their parental care and offspring production, which might 
explain the stable level of investment observed in many animal societies.    
We believe our clarification between tug-of-war and investment models also 
helps resolve the difficulties of testing the tug-of-war model empirically. Cant (2006) 
argues that “rigorous testing of the tug-of-war model is difficult because of the 
nondiscriminating nature of its predictions”: skew is predicted to be insensitive to 
relatedness and the prediction of greater group productivity in more closely related 
groups is also predicted by the complete-control costly young model (Cant & 
Johnstone 1999) and the helping effort model based on kin selection (Cant & Field  
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2001; Kokko et al. 2001). However, as we have pointed out above, although the 
increase in total group output with increasing relatedness is predicted by several 
models, different underlying mechanisms (higher level of  parental care or low within-
group conflict) cause this similar prediction. It is empirically feasible to distinguish the 
two (see Table 3.1). For example, in their elegant experiment in primitively social 
bees, reproductive share was not affected by relatedness and group productivity 
increased as relatedness increased because within- group conflict decreased (Langer et 
al. 2004, Langer P. personal communication), which provided very strong support for 
the tug-of-war model.  
In conclusion, by relaxing the complete-control and fixed-productivity 
assumptions of the original costly young model, we identified the similarities and the 
key differences between different reproductive skew models. These findings simplify 
the seemingly divergent predictions between costly young and the tug-of-war models 
and could potentially help researchers to focus on how animals resolve their conflict 
and why different animal societies employing same or different conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Different reproductive skew models are based on different conflict 
resolution mechanisms (Cant 2006). Identifying the key properties of these alternative 
conflict resolution mechanisms and individual strategies in both theoretical and 
empirical studies would help us better understand the nature of social evolution. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WHY DO COOPERATIVELY BREEDING TAIWAN YUHINAS COOPERATE 
WITH NON-RELATIVES? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
    Most social animals live with kin (Emlen 1995). Based on Hamilton’s rule 
(Hamilton 1964), the threshold for selection to favor altruistic behavior is lower for 
closely related individuals than for non-kin. Most studies of non-kin cooperation have 
focused on the evolutionary stability of such groups (reviews in Dugatkin 2002; 
Gardner & Foster 2008; Nowak 2006). Again, based on Hamilton’s rule, the answer is 
simply: cooperation between non-kin is stable only if the direct fitness of cooperative 
behavior is positive. For example, Vehrencamp (1983) found that non-kin groups are 
more likely to form when the group benefit is large and the payoff of solitary breeding 
is small. Nevertheless, these arguments are not enough to explain why animals 
cooperate with non-kin. Everything else being equal, cooperating with kin would still 
be a better option because the alignment of genetic interests between related 
individuals lowers the level of social conflict. Therefore, the reason why animals form 
non-kin groups, rather than cooperate with kin in the first place, is still largely 
unanswered.  
    Two crucial factors for understanding why some, but not all, social animals form 
groups with non-kin are 1) the availability of kin, and 2) the preference for 
cooperating with kin. Various hypotheses concerning the formation of non-kin groups 
can be summarized by these two factors. One straightforward reason for non-kin 
groups is simply that there are not enough kin available (Aviles et al. 2004; Reeve 
1998; Vehrencamp 1983). In this scenario, non-kin groups form even though group  
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members prefer to cooperate with kin because larger group size is beneficial to every 
group member (Aviles et al. 2004; Reeve 1998).  
    Despite the intrinsic genetic benefit of cooperating with kin, everything else may 
not be equal, and other effects may modulate the preference for cooperating with kin 
versus non-kin. For example, local competition between relatives can potentially 
negate the benefits of kin cooperation (Queller 1994; West et al. 2002). In other 
words, forming kin groups might not be beneficial because low mobility of kin could 
increase local population density and increase local competition between relatives (Le 
Galliard et al. 2005). Another possibility is that the benefit of cooperating with non-
kin is higher than cooperating with kin. For example, genetic diversity, and thus low 
relatedness, promotes colony stability and productivity in social insects (Cole & 
Wiernasz 1999; Jones et al. 2004; Mattila & Seeley 2007). In this case, queens 
actually prefer to create low relatedness groups through multiple mating (Oldroyd & 
Fewell 2007).    
     In addition to the preference and availability of kin, the control of group 
membership also affects the composition and size of social groups (Giraldeau & 
Caraco 1993; Giraldeau & Caraco 2000; Higashi & Yamamura 1993). The insider-
outsider conflict model of group size, referred to as IOM hereafter, describes the 
tension between group members, the insiders, and potential joiners, the outsiders. 
Assuming that per capita fitness follows a hump-shaped curve as group size increases, 
there will be conflict between insiders and outsiders over accepting the joiners. A 
solitary outsider would prefer to join a group as long as the fitness of joining is larger 
than being solitary. However, if the group size is larger than optimal, the addition of 
an outsider decreases the fitness of insiders. Thus, the level of control exercised by 
group insiders affects group size and composition. If solitaries can join any group at 
no cost, the IOM predicts that groups larger than the optimal group size are more  
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likely to be comprised of non-kin. This is because an outsider can still gain by joining 
a group even though the per capita group productivity is decreased. However, if group 
members can repel or accept an intruding outsider, an unrelated individual is likely to 
be repelled when the group size is equal to or larger than the optimal size. In this case, 
larger groups are more likely to be composed of kin.  
     Here we investigate the formation of non-kin groups in joint-nesting Taiwan 
yuhinas (Yuhina brunneiceps). Elsewhere we have shown that most  yuhinas live in 
cooperatively breeding groups comprised of non-kin (Zhong et al, unpublished ms), 
and that direct fitness benefits are responsible for social group formation (Shen 2002; 
Yuan et al. 2004). In this paper, we test three alternative, but not mutually exclusive, 
hypotheses for non-kin group formation:  (1) the kin availability hypothesis, (2) the 
kin competition hypothesis and (3) the insider-outsider conflict model, IMO. If the 
availability of kin is a key constraint on the formation of non-kin group of yuhinas, 
unrelated group members should be more common in larger groups (Aviles et al. 
2004). Also, as reproductive success increases and more fledglings are produced in a 
population or season, more related dyads should be found because more kin are 
available. However, if kin competition plays an important role in determining the 
formation of non-kin group in yuhinas, kin groups should be more likely to form when 
population density is low, such as when reproductive success is low and adult 
mortality is high. Also, related dyads should occur at random rates in different-sized 
groups. Finally, based on IOM, if insiders have control over group membership, 
related individuals are more likely to be accepted when the group size is larger than 
the most productive group size; but both related and unrelated outsiders will be 
accepted when group size is smaller than the most productive size. Therefore, the 
insider-outsider model predicts that kin dyads are more likely to occur in large groups 
than in small groups. Our results are consistent with the predictions of IOM, although  
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the availability of relatives is affected by parental-offspring conflict. We then examine 
the mechanisms of group formation by studying breeding vacancy replacements in 
yuhinas.  
 
METHOD 
Study site and population 
We study Taiwan yuhina at the National Taiwan University Highlands 
Experiment Farm at MeiFeng in central Taiwan (24
。05’N, 121
。10’E, elevation 2150 
m). The size of study area is 50 ha with a system of small roads so that activities of the 
breeding groups could be monitored. In total, 103 year-groups were studied during 
seven field seasons (March- September, 1997-2001, 2003-2007). A group-year is 
defined as the number of groups observed each year over the study period. There were 
6, 7, 6, 8, 18, 9, 15, 15, 14, and 19 groups in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. Additional details of the study site can be 
found in an earlier publication (Lee et al. 2005). 
The yuhina breeding season extends from March/April to September, and yuhinas 
usually make multiple nesting attempts each breeding season. Most yuhinas live in 
joint-nesting groups, in which several monogamous pairs, sometime with unmated 
individuals, lay eggs in the same nest and shared the labor of nest-building, incubating 
and provisioning. Reproductive skew for females is low (0.19, Yuan et al. 2004). After 
the breeding season, the breeding groups disband and the yuhinas join larger ‘feeding 
groups’ comprised of more than 20 individuals. Yuhinas remain in feeding groups 
until the start of the next breeding season when smaller cooperative breeding groups 
form (Yuan et al. 2004). 
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Behavioral observation 
  Adult yuhinas were caught using mist nets. Each individual was banded on 
both legs with one metal ring and a unique combination of three colored plastic leg-
rings. In total, 683 adults and 167 nestlings were banded. Group composition of 
yuhinas was based on censuses conducted on systematic nest watches at 1-3 day 
intervals during the breeding season. The linear dominance hierarchy of each gender 
was determined by the consistent patterns of displacement and chasing (Yuan et al. 
2004). Higher-ranked individuals consistently chase and displace lower-ranked, same-
gender members of the group. The data set for the 10 years consisted of 103 group-
years. For individual pairs that participated in more than one breeding group in the 
same year, the paired data were calculated only once in order to prevent pseudo-
replication. For analysis of reproductive vacancies, the group composition data were 
compiled and the outcomes of 159 vacancies, 85 by females and 74 by males over the 
10-year study period, were noted.  
 
Genetic structure analysis 
  For analysis of genetic relatedness, a total of 69 group-years and 198 different 
individuals, collected in 1998-2001 and 2004, were used in the analyses. We sex-typed 
individuals with 2550F and 2718R primers (Fridolfsson & Ellegren 1999). Each 
individual was genotyped at 6-9 microsatellite loci for kinship assignment and 
relatedness pattern analysis. We used KINGROUP V2 (Konovalov & Heg 2008) 
(http://www.it.jcu.edu.au/kingroup) to compare the relative likelihoods that a given 
pair of birds was closely related (r>0.25) or unrelated (r<0.25). This software uses the 
likelihood formulas proposed by Goodnight & Queller (1999). Given a specific 
hypothesis about particular pedigree relationships, KINGROUP V2 tested the 
hypothesis that alleles were identical by descent as a consequence of the primary  
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hypothesis (kin relationship, r>0.25) or null hypothesis (e.g. unrelated kin relationship, 
r<0.250). Additional details of the molecular method used here can be found in 
(Zhong et al.). The proportions of closely-related kin dyads of each sex within 
cooperatively breeding groups were compared with chi-square tests.    
 
RESULTS 
     Most yuhina offspring dispersed from their natal territories soon after they fledged. 
Only 4.19% of fledglings (n=167), including six males and one female, remained in 
their natal territory in the next breeding season. The genetic data also showed that 
most yuhinas cooperated with non-kin group members. Only 7.58% of within-group 
dyads (n=633) were comprised of kin and the proportion of related dyads was not 
affected by breeding success or adult mortality rates.  However, compared to random 
expectation, males were more likely to live in groups with kin than were females 
(χ
2=5.268, p=0.022, Table 4.1).  
         To test the IOM predictions of group formation and understand the role of 
kinship in the formation of yuhina groups, kinship structures were compared for small 
(group size≤4) and large (group size≥5) groups. Individuals were more likely to live 
with kin in large groups than in small groups relative to random expectations (Fig. 4.1, 
χ
2=5.27, p=0.027).  
     Local recruitment, percentage of fledglings remained in the study area, patterns 
were studied to address the key puzzle of why most yuhinas do not recruit kin when 
there are breeding vacancies. There was a significant effect of nest success rate – the 
percentage of local recruitmentrecruited decreased with an increase in nest success 
rate (Fig. 4.2, linear regression, slope b=-2.924, t=-6.047, p=0.004). There was a trend 
for the percentage of local recruitment to increase as adult mortality rate increased 
(linear regression, slope b=1.213, t=2.502 p=0.067). Fledgling date also has significant  
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effect on local recruitment, with more recruitment of late fledglings (Fig. 4.3, logistic 
regression, p<0.01).   
 To understand the group formation mechanism, the breeding vacancy 
replacements of different sexes and ranks were examined. The breeding vacancies of 
alpha males were more likely to be filled by a lower-ranking male from the same 
group. Other breeding vacancies were mostly filled by individuals from outside the 
group. Specifically, 73% of alpha male vacancies were filled by within-group males 
(insiders), while only 44% of alpha female, 26% of beta female and 31% of beta male 
vacancies were filled by insiders (Table 4.2). However, several factors simultaneously 
affected the resolution of breeding vacancies. Since two-pair groups were most 
common in yuhinas (Fig. 4.4), it is obvious that there were significantly more insiders 
available to fill the alpha vacancies (95.7%, n=69) than the beta vacancies (56.5%, 
n=69, χ
2=18.28, p<0.001, Table 4.2). Thus, availability of insiders had a significant 
effect on the resolution of beta vacancies: beta vacancies were more likely to be filled 
by insiders (56.4%, n=39) if insiders were available compared to all beta vacancies 
(28.6%, n=77, Fisher exact test, p=0.005). Whether or not alpha females remained in 
the group significantly affected the resolution of alpha male vacancies: outsider males 
were more likely to obtain alpha male vacancies when the alpha female remained in 
the group (50%, n=14) than when the alpha female also disappeared (6.3%, n=16, 
Fisher exact test, p=0.012). However, whether opposite-sex breeders remained in the 
group did not affect the resolution of breeding vacancies for other breeding roles 
(Table 4.2). Most alpha and beta vacancies were filled (92.4%, n=158), while 
vacancies of lower ranking individuals, such as gamma and unpaired individuals, were 
significantly less likely to be replaced (8.6%, n=70, Fisher exact test, p<0.001).    
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of related dyads in small (group size=3-4) and large (group 
size>4) compared to the distribution of all dyads.  
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Figure 4.2 The relationship between proportion of fledglings staying in the study area 
in the following season and the nest success rate of the season.  
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Figure 4.3 The relationship between percentage of fledglings staying in the study area 
in the following season and fledged date of the fledglings.  
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Figure 4.4 The group size distribution of Taiwan yuhinas groups.  
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Figure 4.5 The hypothetical figure showing the relationship between insider yuhinas’ 
average inclusive fitness and group size in breeding season and non-breeding season. r 
indicates average relatedness between group members. 
 
DISCUSSION 
       Both our behavioral and genetic data show that most yuhinas cooperate with 
unrelated group members. Since the instances of offspring remaining in their natal 
territory were extremely rare, only seven cases in eight years of study, we focus our 
analysis of within-group kinship using the genetic data. One of the critical predictions 
distinguishing the availability hypothesis, kin competition hypothesis, and the insider-
outsider models is the occurrence of within-group related dyads in different-sized 
groups. Our results show that related dyads occurred more frequently in large groups 
of yuhinas, which is predicted by the insider-outsider model (Giraldeau & Caraco 
1993; Giraldeau & Caraco 2000; Higashi & Yamamura 1993) but is different from the 
predictions of the availability and kin competition hypotheses. Further support for the  
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IOM is provided by the good match between the most commonly observed group size 
(two pairs) and the most reproductively productive group size.  In yuhinas, the most 
productive groups are the two-pair groups, which results from the balance between the 
group benefit of a bet-hedging strategy of coping with fluctuating environmental 
conditions and conflict over the sharing of reproduction (Shen 2002; Yuan et al. 
2004).  
 
  Our results are clearly at odds with the kin availability hypothesis. This 
hypothesis predicts that larger groups are more likely to be comprised of non-kin, but 
we found larger groups to be composed of kin (Aviles et al. 2004; Lukas et al. 2005).  
Moreover, the percentage of fledglings breeding in the study area decreased as nest 
success rate increased, instead of increasing as the availability hypothesis would 
predict. Taken together, this evidence strongly suggests that a lack of available kin is 
not the reason why yuhinas breed with non-kin. We also did not find any evidence that 
reproductive success and adult mortality rate affected the probability of fledglings 
remaining in their natal territory in the next breeding season. Therefore, kin 
competition is also unlikely to be the key factor determining the formation of non-kin 
groups in yuhinas. In short, our results generally support the predictions of the IOM.  
       Since the IOM is based on Hamilton’s rule, this means that if relatives are 
available, insiders are predicted to prefer to cooperate with kin by the IOM. In other 
words, unrelated outsiders would only be accepted when group size is smaller than the 
most productive size. Given that our result supports the IOM, this suggests that 
kinship still plays a role in the formation of yuhina cooperatively breeding groups. 
Why, then, are most of the yuhina groups comprised of non-kin? Again, applying the 
IOM, the prevalence of non-kin groups in yuhinas suggests that when there are 
breeding vacancies, relatives are not available to join the group. However, our result  
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also indicate that availability of kin is not the main reason for yuhinas to form non-kin 
group and there should be enough kin produced each season to fill the breeding 
vacancies. We believe that the key to resolving this seemingly inconsistent result is 
understanding why offspring do not stay in or near their natal territories.   
            Kin groups in most cooperatively breeding species are formed through delayed 
offspring dispersal (Brown 1987; Koenig & Dickinson 2004; Solomon & French 
1997; Stacey & Koenig 1990, but see Hatchwell & Sharp 2006; Sharp et al. 2008). 
However, most yuhinas dispersed from their natal territories. Our results on local 
recruitment show that late fledglings were more likely to breed in the study area in the 
following breeding season.  This result coincides with our observation that adults 
usually evicted the offspring soon after they fledged, unless it was their season’s last 
nesting attempt. Fledglings from the last successful nesting attempt of the season 
usually wintered with their natal groups and dispersed from their natal territories in the 
following spring. This observation suggests that the conflict over the allocation of 
parental investment in different broods is the reason that parents evict their fledglings. 
In other words, the cost of keeping fledglings might be too high for insiders during the 
breeding season and/or fledglings could have higher fitness by dispersing during the 
breeding season. As a result,  an adult's  inclusive fitness of retaining fledglings in the 
group should increase as the end of the breeding season approaches because fewer 
breeding opportunities remain (Fig. 4.5). Because of the stochastic nature of nesting 
success in yuhinas, caused by typhoons and nest predation, many groups end up with 
no relatives around to fill the breeding vacancies in future breeding seasons (Shen 
2002).     
    Our breeding vacancy replacement data helps us further understand the mechanism 
of group formation in yuhinas. In general, higher ranking vacancies, especially alpha 
male vacancies (73%), are more likely to be filled by lower ranking insiders, if lower  
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ranking individuals are available. Almost all alpha male vacancies were filled by 
insiders (15/16 cases) if their mates also disappeared from the group. This suggests 
that social queuing is an important route for male yuhinas to become alpha breeders. 
The social queuing observed in yuhinas also explains the result that most retained 
offspring are males (6/7 cases) and is consistent with the finding that male yuhinas are 
more likely to live with kin than females. However, the vast majority of fledglings, 
both males and females, still dispersed from their natal group before the coming 
breeding season. Only 32.7% of yuhina groups are larger than two pairs and therefore 
most beta vacancies, 74% of beta female and 69% of beta male vacancies, were filled 
by outsiders because lower ranking insiders were not available. The reason that 
yuhinas do not have relatives around to fill the breeding vacancies is because most of 
the fledglings do not stay. On the other hand, this result also suggests that dispersing 
offspring might have relatively good chances of being accepted by other unrelated 
groups, although this kind of dispersal data is extremely difficult to estimate precisely 
in yuhinas, as well as in most other species.   
     
Table 4.1 Cases of individuals who lived with related group members.   
              
   Alpha  Beta 
Gamma or 
unpaired 
Total 
Male  20  18 24 62 
Female  11  12 11 34 
Total  31  30 35 96 
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Table 4.2 Resolutions of reproductive vacancies in Taiwan yuhinas. 
 
Insider 
available?  Breeding 
vacancies 
Mate 
remained 
in the 
group 
Alpha Beta Gamma Un-paired
Insider 
total 
M
1 N Y 
outsider 
total 
No
2 Total
No 0  5 0  3  8  0 0 7  7 1  16  Alpha 
females  Yes 0  9 0  0  9  0 1  14  15 2  26 
No 1  0 0  1  2  3 8 6  17 1  20  Beta 
Females  Yes 2  0 4  2  8  3 6 2  11 4  23 
Total  3  14  4  6 27  6 15  29  50 8  85 
                      
No 0  9 4  2  15  0 0 1  1 1  17  Alpha 
males  Yes 0  5 1  1  7  0 2 5  7 1  15 
No 1  1 1  4  7  1 6 5  12 1  20 
Beta males 
Yes 1  0 3  1  5  1 10 4  15 1  21 
Total  2  15  9  8 34  2 18  15  35 4  74 
1.  whether insiders are available is unknown 
2.  instances of breeding vacancies were not resolved. 
 
Most cooperatively breeding societies are formed by delayed offspring dispersal, and 
therefore most of the group members are closely related to each other (Emlen 1995). 
However, it has also long been acknowledged that the death, divorce or departure of a 
group member and its replacement from unrelated outsiders, will generate complex 
genetic structures within social groups (Emlen 1997). The different genetic 
relatednesses between group members in cooperatively breeding societies is often 
used to test the predictions, such as levels of conflict and helper efforts, of Hamilton’s 
rule (Emlen & Wrege 1988; Griffin & West 2003; Komdeur 1994; Mumme 1992). 
Nonetheless, despite the conceptual elegance, the group membership prediction of  
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IOM has received little attention in studies of cooperative breeding (but see Ost et al. 
2005). As we have shown in this study, the IOM can incorporate the factors of the 
availability and preference of kin and generate simple predictions, which can 
potentially help us understand the mechanisms affecting the group compositions of 
cooperative breeding societies. Furthermore, the occurrence of unrelated individuals in 
social groups are commonly found in broad range of other type of social groups such 
as some cooperative breeding species (Koford et al. 1990; Vehrencamp & Quinn 
2004), fish shoals (Krause et al. 2000; Steck et al. 1999),  lek (Knopp et al. 2008), and 
bat roosting (Metheny et al. 2008). Therefore, the IOM could server as the general 
framework for understanding the group membership and group size in these varieties 
of social groups, especially with the help of molecular tools. 
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